Altman Z″
Needs current assets and current liabilities.
JNPR · Power Generation/Distribution · INE05C901015
Analyst mean 0.00 · 0 analysts · 0% bullishThis company listed within the last twelve months, so its prospectus is still the primary source. The figures below were extracted from the DRHP and RHP before listing and scored then, and they are shown here as they stand in the IPO record rather than restated.
Each flag is a fact read in the filing, shown with the context that makes it meaningful.
Stated objects, as worded in the offer document. Deployment against them is tracked separately.
Claims made in the offer document, to be read against what the company has reported since.
Juniper Green Energy Limited ranks among the top 10 largest renewable independent power producers (IPPs) in India by total capacity, commanding a portfolio of 7,910.20 MW (10,247.06 MWp) across 50 projects as of June 30, 2026. The company’s operational and under-development asset base spans solar, wind, solar-wind hybrid (WSH), and firm and dispatchable renewable energy (FDRE) projects, integrated with Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS). Its primary customers are central and state government utilities, with GUVNL and MSEDCL accounting for 86.06% of Fiscal 2026 operating revenue under 25-year fixed-tariff PPAs. Geographically, its capacity is concentrated in high-resource states: Gujarat (38.03%), Rajasthan (37.72%), Maharashtra (22.30%), and Madhya Pradesh (1.95%). Employing an in-house development model, Juniper manages the full project lifecycle and bypasses turnkey EPC contractors by procuring equipment directly from suppliers like Envision, Suzlon, and Goldi Sun. What distinguishes the company is its exceptional execution track record—achieving a 96.8% bidding-to-winning conversion rate in complex RE tenders (April 2021–March 2026) and commissioning operational projects an average of 147 days ahead of schedule.
Top-10 Indian renewable IPP scale with end-to-end in-house development capabilities, a 96.8% bid-winning conversion rate in complex WSH/FDRE tenders, robust long-term government off-taker backing (86%+ revenue), and an operational track record of commissioning projects 147 days ahead of schedule on average.
Juniper Green Energy Limited is an independent power producer (IPP) in India engaged in developing, building, owning, operating, and maintaining utility-scale renewable energy projects including solar, wind, solar-wind hybrid (WSH), and firm & dispatchable renewable energy (FDRE). The company earns revenue primarily through the sale of electricity under long-term Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) with government utilities as well as merchant sales on power exchanges.
Source: RHP Our Business p. 324-341
Where the revenue came from, as the document splits it.
| Name | Pct | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Sale of electricity | 98.65 | RHP p. 108, 538 |
| Sale of Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs) | 0.89 | RHP p. 108, 538 |
| Sale of Voluntary Emission Reductions (VERs) | 0.45 | RHP p. 108, 538 |
India's renewable energy sector is undergoing rapid expansion, driven by ambitious net-zero commitments, supportive policy frameworks such as PLI schemes, and Energy Storage Obligations. To maintain grid stability and provide firm, round-the-clock power, market demand is shifting toward complex multi-technology tenders like Solar-Wind Hybrid (WSH) and Firm & Dispatchable Renewable Energy (FDRE) paired with Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS). India possesses substantial renewable potential (~696 GW wind at 120m hub height and ~750 GW solar), concentrated in key windy and high-irradiance states like Gujarat and Rajasthan. IPPs with in-house engineering capabilities, secured land banks, surplus grid connectivity, and disciplined bidding strategies hold a distinct competitive edge.
Growth rate: 50-52 GW annual capacity additions by FY30-FY31
Market size: 230-250 GW solar capacity additions (FY27-FY31)
Sector slug: renewable-energy
Source: RHP Industry Overview p. 248-323
The comparable set the company chose, which is itself a disclosure.
| Name | Margin | Pb | Pe | Roe | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ACME Solar Holdings Limited | 47.21 | 9.86 | p. 188 | ||
| NTPC Green Energy Limited | 148.34 | 2.76 | p. 188 | ||
| Adani Green Energy Limited | 156.88 | 8.27 | p. 188 | ||
| Renew Global Energy PLC | 22.25 | 8.25 | p. 188 |
As presented in the offer document. Post-listing figures are in the statements above.
| Period | Related party revenue cr | Pat cr | Ebitda cr | Pat margin | Revenue cr | Pat margin derived | Cff cr |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY26 | 49.35 | 40.464 | 5.63% | 718.934 | yes | 6866.196 | |
| FY25 | 16.168 | 36.478 | 7.17% | 508.678 | yes | 4071.221 | |
| FY24 | 40.064 | 10.23% | 391.55 | yes | 1231.381 |
Written before listing, answered from the document itself.
Where is the money going?
Out of the ₹1,800.00 crore Fresh Issue, ₹683.24 crore will be used for repayment/prepayment of company borrowings, ₹728.69 crore for repayment/prepayment of borrowings availed by subsidiaries, and the balance for general corporate purposes.
RHP p. 169, 171, 178
How concentrated is the customer base?
Highly concentrated. The top two customers—GUVNL (Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd) and MSEDCL (Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd)—accounted for 39.85% and 46.21% respectively, totaling 86.06% of FY26 revenue from operations.
RHP p. 26
Is it profitable and growing?
Yes. Revenue from operations grew from ₹391.55 crore in FY24 to ₹508.68 crore in FY25 and ₹718.93 crore in FY26 (a 35.5% CAGR). Net profit (PAT) stood at ₹40.46 crore in FY26, with an EBITDA of ₹692.18 crore (85.99% margin), though net profit was constrained by ₹400.13 crore in finance costs and ₹236.86 crore in depreciation.
RHP p. 95, 288, 539
What sits in the footnotes / contingent liabilities?
Total contingent liabilities as of March 31, 2026 stand at ₹2,210.51 crore, primarily consisting of bank guarantees (₹1,317.75 crore performance BGs, ₹188.70 crore bid bond BGs, and ₹675.87 crore other BGs). Footnotes also reveal a ₹65.00 crore arbitration claim filed by former CEO Naresh Mansukhani, and auditor remarks noting that accounting software lacked database-level audit trails until March 21, 2026.
RHP p. 55, 74, 97, 500, 523
What the issue priced at, on the figures in the document.
| Date | Name | Shares | Price per share | Category | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025-03-13 | Juniper Renewable Holdings Pte. Ltd. | 3910500 | 1163.84 | promoter | p. 150, 158, 197 |
| 2024-12-20 | Juniper Renewable Holdings Pte. Ltd. | 5782333 | 974.52 | promoter | p. 150, 158, 197 |
| 2024-12-20 | Juniper Renewable Holdings Pte. Ltd. | 3907359 | 974.52 | promoter | p. 150, 158, 197 |
| 2024-04-26 | Juniper Renewable Holdings Pte. Ltd. | 2723924 | 844.37 | promoter | p. 150, 158, 197 |
| 2024-04-09 | Juniper Renewable Holdings Pte. Ltd. | 2225816 | 673.91 | promoter | p. 150, 158 |
Ceo: Ankush Malik (Whole-time Director and Chief Executive Officer)
Against Company: 6 indirect tax cases (₹3.71 million) and 1 material civil proceeding (₹795.78 million). Against Directors/Promoters: 1 FIR (Experion Developers case, ₹1.95 million) and 1 tax proceeding (₹1.95 million). Against Subsidiaries: 1 FIR, 2 indirect tax cases (₹0.60 million), and 3 material civil proceedings (₹503.85 million). Former CEO Arbitration Claim: ₹650.00 million.
Juniper Renewable Holdings Pte. Ltd. holds 100.00% of the pre-Issue equity share capital (488,989,292 Equity Shares). The IPO is an 100% Fresh Issue of up to ₹18,000.00 million with zero Offer for Sale, so the promoters are not diluting via secondary sale and will retain majority ownership post-listing.
Rule 11(g) reporting: Accounting software lacked feature of recording audit trails (edit log) at database level for direct data changes for FY24, FY25, and FY26 until enabled on March 21, 2026. Material RPTs include intercompany loans, EPC services, business support, and corporate guarantees by Corporate Promoters.
Source: RHP p. 1, 17, 26, 54-55, 74, 97-102, 148, 158, 451, 634-639
A change between the two filings is a disclosure in itself.
| Field | Rhp value | Drhp value | Note | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total issue size (Fresh Issue) | Aggregating up to ₹18,000.00 million | Aggregating up to ₹30,000.00 million | The total issue size (consisting entirely of a fresh issue) was reduced by ₹12,000.00 million (a 40% cut) between the draft and final filings. | DRHP p. 1, 25; RHP p. 1, 91 |
| Financial Information Period | Restated financial statements for the full financial years ended March 31, 2026, 2025 and 2024 | Restated financial statements for the nine-month period ended December 31, 2024 and Fiscals 2024, 2023 and 2022 | The restated financial statements were rolled forward to cover full fiscal year 2026, dropping the 9-month interim stub and Fiscals 2022 and 2023. | DRHP p. 1, 19; RHP p. 1, 20, 95 |
| Litigation / Dispute with Former CEO | Added disclosure regarding a legal notice dated August 6, 2025 and SEBI complaint by former CEO Naresh Mansukhani seeking ₹650.00 million in compensation | Not present in the DRHP | A major arbitration and regulatory dispute with former key managerial personnel was added to the RHP. | RHP p. 55, 657 |
| Designated Stock Exchange | National Stock Exchange of India Limited (NSE) | [●] | NSE was formally designated as the Designated Stock Exchange in the RHP. | DRHP p. 7; RHP p. 7 |
| Audit Trail Controls (Rule 11(g)) | Audit trail feature enabled at database level on March 21, 2026 | Audit trail feature not enabled at database level for direct data changes during the audit period | The RHP updated auditor remarks to reflect that database-level edit logging was implemented on March 21, 2026. | DRHP p. 523; RHP p. 604 |
Numbered markers are corporate actions and, once the filings are read, capital and governance events. Prices are split-adjusted so the series is continuous.
What the numbers mean when read together — computed from the filings, not a score.
Free cash flow is negative — the business consumes more than it generates once capex is paid. Fine if it is deliberate growth investment; a problem if it is structural.
Why this reading: Noted with caution — worth watching, but not yet conclusive on its own. Business has ups and downs; one soft reading is not a verdict.
Latest free cash flow ₹-6,162 cr, negative in 5 of 5 years. Check whether the burn funds expansion (dark stores, plants, ports) or merely sustains operations.
Borrowings rose 376% over two years while the company also carries ₹160 cr in investments. Why borrow at interest while parking money elsewhere is a fair question.
Why this reading: Noted with caution — worth watching, but not yet conclusive on its own. Business has ups and downs; one soft reading is not a verdict.
Borrowings moved to ₹13,761 cr from ₹2,894 cr. Simultaneous large investments can be legitimate treasury management, or a sign that reported cash is not freely available.
Capital work-in-progress has stayed high (99% of fixed assets) without converting to productive assets — worth checking whether projects are genuinely progressing.
Why this reading: Noted with caution — worth watching, but not yet conclusive on its own. Business has ups and downs; one soft reading is not a verdict.
CWIP ₹7,373 cr vs ₹413 cr two years earlier, against fixed assets ₹7,460 cr. Perennial CWIP that never becomes a fixed asset can hide stalled projects or capitalised costs that should have been expensed.
Operating cash is 1175% of trailing profit — the earnings are converting to real cash, not just accruals.
Why this reading: A positive signal: cash conversion at or above ~0.9 means reported profit is showing up as actual cash.
Operating cash ₹470 cr against trailing net profit ₹40 cr. Consistent conversion near or above 1.0 is a hallmark of genuine earnings.
Debt rose over 3 years, and most of it (104%) has turned into fixed assets and projects under construction — the borrowing is building the business.
Why this reading: A positive signal: leverage taken on is visibly becoming productive capacity, not disappearing.
New borrowing ₹11,467 cr largely matched by an asset build of ₹11,911 cr. Debt that funds capacity is a different thing from debt that funds nothing.
Net margin improved from 7.1% to 11.3% year-on-year — the business is keeping more of each rupee.
Why this reading: A positive signal in the numbers, shown for balance alongside the concerns.
Quarter net margin 11.3% vs 7.1% four quarters earlier. Expansion from operating leverage is healthy; verify it is not a one-off gain.
Every score below is calculated here from the reported numbers — none of it is asserted. Open the notebook at the foot of the section to see each formula with this company's figures in it.
Needs current assets and current liabilities.
Piotroski F-Score — fundamental momentum — Joseph Piotroski, University of Chicago, 2000, in a study of whether accounting signals could improve returns among cheap stocks.
Nine yes-or-no tests across profitability, leverage and operating efficiency. Each pass scores one. It asks a narrow question: is this business getting better or worse on its own terms, year over year?
How to read it7 or more suggests improving fundamentals; 3 or fewer suggests deterioration. It measures direction, not quality — a weak company improving can score higher than a strong one holding steady.
Where it failsA single year of comparison, so one unusual year distorts it. Says nothing about valuation, competitive position or management. Piotroski designed it to rank already-cheap stocks, not to judge a company in isolation.
Needs trade receivables, current assets, other expenses.
Accruals are -2.9% of assets. Free cash flow negative in 5 of 5 years.
DuPont decomposition — Devised inside the DuPont Corporation in the 1920s and still the standard way to read a return on equity.
Splits return on equity into its three sources, so the same headline number can be traced to very different businesses.
How to read itA 20% ROE built on margin and turnover is a different proposition from a 20% ROE built on 3× leverage. The first survives a downturn; the second amplifies it.
Where it failsA single year. Negative equity makes it meaningless. Leverage is structural for lenders, so the third term carries no signal there.
Capital is going in far faster than revenue is coming out. For a business mid-build that is expected — the test is whether it converts.
cumulative operating cash flow ÷ cumulative net profit
₹1,554 cr ÷ ₹131 cr, over 5 years
11.86×
Above 1.0 means cash exceeds reported profit — the healthier reading.(net profit − operating cash flow) ÷ average total assets
(₹40 − ₹470) cr ÷ average assets
-2.9%
Negative means cash exceeded profit — the healthier reading. Positive above ~10% is where accruals start to dominate earnings.net margin × asset turnover × leverage
5.6% × 0.04 × 5.70
1.2%
Splits ROE into whether returns come from operations or from borrowing.EBIT ÷ finance cost
₹455 cr ÷ ₹400 cr
1.14×
How many times operating profit covers the interest bill.borrowings ÷ net worth
₹13,761 cr ÷ ₹3,424 cr
4.02×
Read against the sector — infrastructure carries more than software.growth in fixed assets + CWIP, against growth in revenue
capital +408% vs revenue +117%, FY2023 to FY2026
290pp gap
Money going in far faster than revenue coming out. For an incubator this is expected — the test is whether it eventually converts.Needs more balance-sheet detail (only 3 of 6 flags testable).
NOPAT over equity plus debt less cash, at a notional 25% tax. Incremental ROIC is the return on money put in since then — the number that decides whether growth creates value or consumes it.
Return on invested capital, and incremental ROIC — Standard in corporate finance; the incremental form was popularised by Michael Mauboussin as the test of whether growth creates value.
ROIC measures what the business earns on all the capital it employs — equity plus debt, less cash. Incremental ROIC asks a sharper question: what has it earned on the money put in since a chosen year?
How to read itROIC comfortably above the cost of capital — call it 11–13% in India — means growth compounds. Below it, growth consumes. Incremental below headline means recent investment is earning less than the legacy business.
Where it failsDistorted in the year of a large acquisition. Understated for companies mid-build, where capital is deployed but capacity has not yet been commissioned — an incubator will look poor until it does not.
Read downward. Cash can cover EBITDA and still not survive capex — the third rung is where a capital-hungry business shows itself.
The earnings quality ladder — Not a named model — the standard sequence an analyst walks when testing whether reported profit is real.
Three ratios read in order, each stricter than the last.
How to read itRead downward. Each rung failing where the one above passed tells you exactly where the cash is going.
Where it failsA single year of heavy capex depresses the third rung legitimately. Judge it across a cycle.
Against a policy rate near 6%, most sound Indian corporates borrow between 7% and 10%.
Cost of debt — Interest expense over average borrowings — the effective rate the company actually pays.
What the lenders charge, which is a market verdict on credit quality that no rating agency delay affects.
How to read itAgainst a policy rate near 6%, most sound Indian corporates borrow between 7% and 10%. Read the direction over years as much as the level.
Where it failsUnderstated where a large share of interest is capitalised into projects under construction. Not meaningful for lenders, where interest is cost of goods.
Models that need these lines are withheld rather than estimated: net worth, current assets, current liabilities, trade receivables, inventory, net block. Nothing on this page is back-solved from a figure the company did not publish.
Each framework below is a set of stated, mechanical criteria from published work, run against this company's own filed numbers. Passing or failing a screen is not a verdict — different frameworks disagree by design, and that disagreement is itself informative.
Benjamin Graham's stated criteria for a defensive stock, applied to the filed numbers. A company failing several is not disqualified — Graham designed these to be deliberately strict.
Two ratios only: what the business earns on its capital, and what you pay for those earnings. Designed to be ranked across a universe rather than read in isolation.
The fundamental half of William O'Neil's framework. The market and leadership components are judgement calls and are not scored here.
The characteristics long-term holders commonly look for: cash-backed earnings, high returns on capital, and debt that never forces a decision.
Bars are revenue; the line is net margin. Revenue rising while the line falls is the shape worth noticing.
Operating cash first, then what the business spent and raised.
One year is a snapshot. These are the two lines that matter across a cycle.
Rising debtor or inventory days against flat sales is the earliest visible sign of stress.
Set your own assumptions and watch the numbers move. A scenario calculator — the outputs are the arithmetic of your inputs.
One canonical set of figures — the same numbers used everywhere else on this page and on the screener.
How the register has moved over recent quarters — the direction matters more than the level.
Promoter held steady from 85.94% to 85.94% across these quarters.
FII held steady from 1.77% to 1.77% across these quarters.
MF held steady from 4.37% to 4.37% across these quarters.
Other held steady from 7.92% to 7.92% across these quarters.
Where cash gets stuck. A rising inventory or debtor line against flat sales is the earliest sign of trouble in the numbers.
| Measure | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debtor days
How long customers take to pay | 49 | 55 | 58 | 52 | 57 |
| Cash conversion cycle
Debtor + inventory − payable days | 49 | 55 | 58 | 52 | 57 |
| Working capital days | -2,411 | -147 | -417 | -640 | -1,851 |
| ROCE %
Return on capital employed | — | 7.0% | 6.0% | 4.0% | 3.0% |
The shape of the business over time (annual) — read the direction, not the single print.
| Line | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from operations | 171 | 331 | 392 | 509 | 719 |
| Other income | 19 | 31 | 33 | 61 | 84 |
| Depreciation | 44 | 110 | 122 | 166 | 237 |
| Finance cost | 84 | 198 | 191 | 264 | 400 |
| Profit before tax | 37 | -10 | 58 | 55 | 55 |
| Net profit (owners) | 27 | -12 | 40 | 36 | 40 |
| EPS (₹) | 19.72 | -8.73 | 15.46 | 0.75 | 0.83 |
Exceptional items, total income and EBITDA are read from the filed statements.
| Metric | Jun 2025 | Mar 2026 | Jun 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 161 | 213 | 291 |
| Other Income | 21 | 31 | 33 |
| Expenses | 23 | 30 | 30 |
| Depreciation | 50 | 67 | 75 |
| Finance cost | 79 | 119 | 176 |
| Profit before tax | 29 | 28 | 44 |
| Net Profit | 22 | 22 | 33 |
| EPS | 0.44 | 0.44 | 0.68 |
| Item | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Equity Capital | 14 | 14 | 26 | 489 | 489 |
| Reserves | 778 | 769 | 1,706 | 2,871 | 2,935 |
| Borrowings | 1,780 | 2,294 | 2,894 | 5,971 | 13,761 |
| Net block | 2,025 | 2,903 | 3,443 | 4,599 | 7,460 |
| CWIP | 659 | 19 | 413 | 2,019 | 7,373 |
| Investments | 3 | 20 | 82 | 132 | 160 |
| Total Assets | 3,071 | 3,205 | 4,975 | 10,331 | 19,500 |
| Line | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash from operations | 142 | 255 | 322 | 365 | 470 |
| Cash from investing | -1,448 | -453 | -1,579 | -4,183 | -6,510 |
| Cash from financing | 1,319 | 212 | 1,231 | 4,071 | 6,866 |
| Free cash flow | -1,083 | -360 | -506 | -2,205 | -6,162 |
| Net change in cash | 13 | 13 | -25 | 253 | 826 |
Cash from operations is the number profit has to answer to. Free cash flow is what remains after the business pays for its own growth.
These are coverage counts, not ratings. Each one asks a fixed set of questions of the filings and reports how many the company answered. A company that discloses nothing counts nothing here — that is a statement about the disclosure, not about the business.
The same read, applied to the companies this one competes with.