Caliber Mining & Logistics Limited
FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge
Caliber Mining and Logistics Limited is an integrated mining operator specializing in overburden removal, coal extraction, and logistics services. The company generates revenue primarily through contractual fees for coal mining, overburden removal, and end-to-end logistics solutions including loading, unloading, and transportation.
What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾
Caliber Mining and Logistics Limited is a prominent mineral-contracting and logistics company providing end-to-end solutions, encompassing coal and iron ore extraction, overburden (OB) removal, and coal logistics. Operating primarily across Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, and Chhattisgarh, the company executes large-scale mining contracts without owning the mines, servicing major clients such as subsidiaries of Coal India Limited (CIL) like Western Coalfields Limited (WCL) and Northern Coalfields Limited (NCL). The company commands a significant market share in contractual OB removal, backed by a massive fleet of 1,911 vehicles and mining equipment, including tippers, excavators, and loaders. Its unique value proposition includes offering both mining and transportation services, supported by strong in-house maintenance capabilities and workshops that optimize operating costs. With an unexecuted order book of ₹9,55,089.08 lakhs as of May 2026, the company derives over 86% of its revenue from coal mining and OB removal, and about 12% from logistics, positioning it as a rapidly growing player in the Indian contract mining industry.
- Coal mining services — Primarily includes coal extraction and overburden removal on a contractual basis for WCL and NCL, as well as other private companies.
- Logistics — Primarily includes loading, unloading and road transportation of coal and iron.
- Coal trading — Primarily includes the buying and selling of coal.
- Rake loading — Loading coal onto rail rakes using company machinery.
- Rail coordination services — Assisting customers to coordinate movement of coal by rail on Indian Railways.
End-to-end integrated mining and logistics services coupled with a large owned fleet of 1,911 vehicles and strong in-house maintenance workshops that provide substantial cost savings and operational efficiencies.
The Offer
Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds
- Repayment/ prepayment, in full or part, of certain borrowings availed by our Company — ₹208.00 cr
- Funding capital expenditure for purchase of commercial vehicles, plant and machinery — ₹167.00 cr
- General corporate purposes
Valuation at the Offer Price
The filing does not print a single headline multiple, so this one is ours: the upper band divided by the latest restated earnings per share — the same arithmetic the “Basis for the Offer Price” section performs. It is struck on pre-issue earnings, so the post-issue figure will differ once the fresh capital is deployed. The peer group is the one the filing itself names. A premium is not the same thing as expensive and a discount is not the same thing as cheap — the peer table and the reasons sit further down this page.
FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built
Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures and what it is worth. Components with no disclosed input are dropped from the weighting entirely rather than held at an invented neutral, because a constant inside a weighted average is not neutral — it quietly drags every score toward the middle. Weighted across 5 live components.
88% of the designed weighting had real data behind it on this issue. Not yet scored here: Anchor Quality. A lower coverage figure does not mean a worse company — it means we are standing behind less of the picture, and you should read the findings below rather than the headline number.
How this is measured12%
Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.
How this is measured32%
Driven by the models battery run on the filing's own restated numbers: the Piotroski fundamental tests (scored out of those we could actually run), the Altman Z-double-prime solvency zone, and the direction of profit across the disclosed period. It is not a single yes/no on last year's profit.
How this is measured10%
The post-issue earnings multiple against the peer median disclosed in the filing. A discount to the median scores well and a premium scores badly. When the filing does not disclose comparable peer multiples, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than held at a made-up neutral.
How this is measured6%
A proxy for syndicate strength, based today only on how many lead managers are on the issue: 75 where three or more banks are involved, 60 otherwise. We have not built a bank-by-bank track record, so treat this as a rough signal. When the filing does not disclose the syndicate, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than guessed.
How this is measured28%
Starts at 100 and loses points for every material finding: 12 for a flagged finding, 4 for a noted one. Two kinds feed it. DERIVED findings are computed from the filed numbers against stated thresholds — operating cash negative while profit is positive, related-party revenue above 15% of total, revenue rising while profit falls, goodwill above 30% of net worth, receivables growing more than 1.3x faster than sales, cash below half of short-term debt. Those are reproducible: the same filing gives the same answer every time, and the rule is printed beside the finding. READ findings come from the forensic sweep of the notes. Contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications, statutory dues, promoter funding. Findings that record the ABSENCE of a problem — no litigation pending, an unmodified audit opinion — deduct nothing. This is the component our forensic read drives directly, and it moves most between companies.
3-Year Financial & Growth Trend
| Metric | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 1677.661 | 1430.404 | 953.116 |
| Net Profit (₹ Cr) | 157.9 | 131.549 | 95.902 |
| PAT Margin | 9.41% | 9.2% | 10.06% |
Revenue Breakdown
- Coal mining services: 86.08%
- Logistics: 12.44%
- Coal trading: 0.92%
- Rake loading: 0.54%
- Rail coordination services: 0.02%
Market Context
NOT part of the FinMinutes ScoreThe Score above is what the filing says. Everything in this box is what the crowd says. We keep them apart on purpose — every other site blends the two and calls the result a rating. Demand is real information, but it is information about the market, not about the company, and it changes by the hour while the company does not.
The market is bidding this issue enthusiastically. The headline financials look strong, but our forensic read of the filing is not clean — the risk band is high and the footnotes carry material flags. That gap is the fact worth noticing. Strong demand is information about the market; the flags are information about the company, and the two are not saying the same thing here. Read the Forensic Findings below before the momentum decides it for you.
Subscription is low early in a book and high at the end, because most bids arrive in the final hours. A number read on day one says more about the clock than the company — which is precisely why it is not in the Score. GMP is unofficial, unregulated, and easily moved. Neither is a recommendation.
Deep Financials
Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.
Income StatementThe profit and loss as filed, then what we derive from it — kept apart.
Statutory order, exactly as restated in the filing. Finance cost and depreciation sit inside Total Expenses under Ind AS, which is why they are listed among the expense lines here rather than below the total. The expense rows sum to the total. Rows the filing does not disclose separately are omitted rather than left blank.
| Income Statement — as filed (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 1,677.66 | 1,430.40 | 953.12 |
| Other Income | 7.00 | 5.16 | 4.81 |
| Total Income | 1,684.66 | 1,435.57 | 957.92 |
| Employee Benefit Expense | 186.84 | 146.56 | 97.74 |
| Finance Cost | 81.25 | 73.98 | 51.45 |
| Depreciation & Amortisation | 137.02 | 103.77 | 68.10 |
| Other Expenses | 214.16 | 196.54 | 104.91 |
| Total Expenses | 1,465.01 | 1,258.39 | 829.52 |
| Profit Before Tax | 212.55 | 177.01 | 124.72 |
| Tax Expense | 54.65 | 45.46 | 28.82 |
| Profit After Tax | 157.90 | 131.55 | 95.90 |
| EPS - Basic | 29.47 | 24.55 | 18.80 |
| EPS - Diluted | 29.47 | 24.55 | 18.80 |
Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.
| Balance Sheet (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share Capital | 53.58 | 53.58 | 51.00 |
| Reserves & Surplus | 593.96 | 435.71 | 244.93 |
| Net Worth | 647.54 | 489.30 | 295.93 |
| Long-term Borrowings | 698.67 | 346.57 | 412.88 |
| Short-term Borrowings | 358.94 | 305.20 | 312.63 |
| Total Borrowings | 1,057.61 | 651.78 | 725.51 |
| Trade Payables | 165.44 | 53.28 | 80.87 |
| Current Liabilities | 596.58 | 431.73 | 438.43 |
| Total Liabilities | 1,429.85 | 914.80 | 983.25 |
| Property, Plant & Equipment | 1,291.33 | 779.03 | 707.74 |
| Intangible Assets | 0.10 | 0.14 | 0.17 |
| Investments | 4.68 | 4.72 | 5.65 |
| Inventories | 125.29 | 68.15 | 64.03 |
| Trade Receivables | 135.58 | 252.65 | 116.86 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 7.37 | 2.86 | 3.39 |
| Current Assets | 610.90 | 452.35 | 407.99 |
| Total Assets | 2,077.39 | 1,404.09 | 1,279.18 |
Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.
| Cash Flow (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | 411.04 | 278.37 | 48.22 |
| Capital Expenditure | 635.40 | 156.31 | 367.21 |
| Net Cash from Investing Activities | -691.92 | -157.41 | -327.31 |
| Net Cash from Financing Activities | 285.39 | -121.49 | 276.49 |
| Net Change in Cash | 4.51 | -0.53 | -2.60 |
Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.
Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.
| Ratio | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Profitability | |||
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 25.6 | 24.7 | 25.5 |
| EBIT Margin (%) | 17.4 | 17.5 | 18.4 |
| PAT Margin (%) | 9.4 | 9.2 | 10.1 |
| Return on Equity (%) | 24.4 | 26.9 | 32.4 |
| Return on Capital Employed (%) | 17.2 | 22 | 17.2 |
| Return on Assets (%) | 7.6 | 9.4 | 7.5 |
| Leverage | |||
| Debt / Equity (x) | 1.63 | 1.33 | 2.45 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA (x) | 2.44 | 1.83 | 2.96 |
| Interest Coverage (x) | 3.62 | 3.39 | 3.42 |
| Liquidity | |||
| Current Ratio (x) | 1.02 | 1.05 | 0.93 |
| Quick Ratio (x) | 0.81 | 0.89 | 0.78 |
| Efficiency | |||
| Asset Turnover (x) | 0.81 | 1.02 | 0.75 |
| Receivable Days | 29 | 64 | 45 |
| Inventory Days | 27 | 17 | 25 |
| Payable Days | 36 | 14 | 31 |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (days) | 20 | 67 | 39 |
| Quality of Earnings | |||
| Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x) | 2.6 | 2.12 | 0.5 |
| Accruals Ratio (%) | -12.2 | -10.5 | 3.7 |
| Capex / Depreciation (x) | 4.64 | 1.51 | 5.39 |
DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.
A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.
| Component | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Margin (PAT / Revenue) | 9.4% | 9.2% | 10.1% |
| Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets) | 0.81x | 1.02x | 0.75x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth) | 3.21x | 2.87x | 4.32x |
| = Return on Equity | 24.4% | 26.9% | 32.4% |
| Tax Burden (PAT / PBT) | 0.74x | 0.74x | 0.77x |
| Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT) | 0.72x | 0.71x | 0.71x |
| Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue) | 17.5% | 17.5% | 18.5% |
Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.
Quality of EarningsWhat the statements say when you read them against each other.
What the statements say once you read them against each other. These are observations, not verdicts — every one is arithmetic on the numbers the company itself disclosed, and each is stated so you can go and check it in the filing.
- Operating cash flow was 2.6x reported profit in FY26. Earnings are converting into cash, which is what you want to see and frequently is not the case.
- Debt to equity stood at 1.63x in FY26.
Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman and Piotroski — plus our own final-year check.
Beneish M-Score
7 of 8 inputsAn eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.
| Component | Value | What it captures |
|---|---|---|
| DSRI Days Sales in Receivables Index (Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1) | 0.458 | Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection. |
| GMI Gross Margin Index GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t | — | Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate. |
| AQI Asset Quality Index AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets | 0.685 | Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here. |
| SGI Sales Growth Index Sales_t / Sales_t-1 | 1.173 | Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going. |
| DEPI Depreciation Index DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE) | 1.225 | Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit. |
| SGAI SG&A Index (SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses | 0.996 | A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure. |
| LVGI Leverage Index Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets | 1.125 | Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers. |
| TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets (PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets | -0.1219 | The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash. |
The filing does not disclose every input the model needs, so we withhold the composite score rather than substitute a guess. The components we could compute are above.
Altman Z″-Score (emerging markets)
Z″ = 5.65 · SafeA distress-prediction model. We use the Z″ variant deliberately: the original Z was calibrated on American manufacturers and misleads badly on Indian services companies. Above 2.6 is the safe zone, 1.1 to 2.6 is grey, below 1.1 is the distress zone. Like every model of its kind it is a screen, not a prophecy.
| X1 — Working Capital / Total Assets | 0.007 |
| X2 — Retained Earnings / Total Assets | 0.286 |
| X3 — EBIT / Total Assets | 0.141 |
| X4 — Net Worth / Total Liabilities | 0.453 |
| Z″ = 3.25 + 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X4 | 5.65 |
Piotroski F-Score (adapted)
3 / 8Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test and score out of eight, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it.
- ✓Positive return on assets
- ✓Positive operating cash flow
- ✗Return on assets improving
- ✓Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
- ✗Long-term leverage decreasing
- ✗Current ratio improving
- —Gross margin improving
- ✗Asset turnover improving
Ratios Nobody Prints
- Contingent liabilities / Net worth: 70.8%
Contingent liabilities of 458.53 cr against a net worth of 647.54 cr — 70.8% of what the company is worth on paper. These are obligations that sit off the balance sheet but could land on it. What they consist of matters as much as the size: a corporate guarantee to a subsidiary is a different animal from a disputed tax demand, and the filing says which. - Related-party revenue / Total revenue: 0.4%
0.4% of revenue in FY26 came from entities connected to the promoters. Revenue you sell to yourself is not the same as revenue you won in the market. - Cash / Short-term borrowings: 0.02x
Short-term borrowings of 358.94 cr against cash of 7.37 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is only comfortable while lenders stay comfortable. - Promoter remuneration / PAT: 5.6%
Managerial remuneration to the promoter group was 8.82 cr against a profit of 157.90 cr. This is a legitimate cost — but it is also a route by which value leaves a company before it ever reaches a minority shareholder.
The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.
Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.
PAT ÷ Net Worth157.90 ÷ 647.54What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.
EBIT ÷ (Net Worth + Total Borrowings)293.80 ÷ (647.54 + 1,057.61) = 293.80 ÷ 1,705.16Return on ALL the capital in the business, borrowed as well as owned. Unlike ROE, it cannot be flattered by taking on debt.
EBITDA ÷ Revenue430.81 ÷ 1,677.66Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.
Total Borrowings ÷ Net Worth1,057.61 ÷ 647.54How much the company has borrowed against what it owns. High is not automatically bad — ask whether the borrowing is being serviced comfortably.
EBIT ÷ Finance Cost293.80 ÷ 81.25How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.
(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365(135.58 ÷ 1,677.66) × 365How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.
Inventory Days + Receivable Days − Payable Days27 + 29 − 36How long cash is tied up in the operating cycle before it comes back. The longer it is, the more working capital the business must fund.
Cash from Operations ÷ PAT411.04 ÷ 157.90Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.
(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets(157.90 − 411.04) ÷ 2,077.39 = -253.14 ÷ 2,077.39The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.
Price × Post-issue Shares₹424.00 × 53,579,912 sharesWhat the whole company is being valued at, if the issue prices at the top of the band.
Market Cap + Total Borrowings − Cash2,271.79 + 1,057.61 − 7.37What it would actually cost to buy the whole business: you take on its debt and you get its cash. This is the number a buyer cares about, and it is the reason a P/E on its own can mislead.
Enterprise Value ÷ EBITDA3,322.03 ÷ 430.81The multiple that includes debt. Two companies on the same P/E — one debt-free, one heavily borrowed — are not the same investment, and only this number tells you so.
Market Cap ÷ PAT2,271.79 ÷ 157.90The familiar multiple. Useful, but blind to debt — read it alongside EV/EBITDA, never instead of it.
EBIT × (1 − tax rate) ÷ (Net Worth + Debt − Cash)NOPAT ÷ Invested CapitalWhat the business earns on the capital actually at work in it. We do not compare this to a cost of capital: that would need a beta, an unlisted company has none, and inventing one would be theatre.
P/E ÷ trailing PAT growth (%)14.39 ÷ 20%PEG was designed for FORWARD growth. This one uses TRAILING growth, because that is all a prospectus gives us — and the final year before an IPO is very often the best year the company will have for a while. A low PEG here may say more about the timing of the filing than about the price. We show it because it was asked for; we show the growth denominator beside it so it cannot mislead you quietly.
Workspace
The post-issue share count is stated as “[•]” in this filing until final pricing, so we derive it: profit after tax divided by earnings per share gives the pre-issue count, and the fresh issue divided by the offer price gives the new shares. Everything below rests on that derivation. It is close, not exact.
The numbers are already loaded. Move the offer price and watch every multiple move with it. Set your own growth and margin and see what they imply two years out. These are your assumptions, not our forecast — we have no view on what this company will earn, and the moment we published one we would be doing something we are not registered to do. What we can do is put the arithmetic in front of you and get out of the way.
Price defaults to the top of the band. Margin defaults to what the company actually reported in FY26.
Projections are arithmetic on the inputs you typed. They are not a forecast, not a recommendation, and not a view on whether this offer is worth taking. Educational only.
Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive
The Indian contract mining and logistics sector is experiencing robust growth driven by increasing energy demand and the government's push to ramp up domestic coal production to reduce import dependency. The total contract mining market is expanding rapidly, with Coal India Limited (CIL) significantly increasing its outsourcing of coal production and overburden (OB) removal to private contractors to meet production targets. The industry is highly capital intensive, requiring large fleets of heavy earth-moving machinery, and favors players with strong financial capabilities, execution track records, and in-house maintenance infrastructure to mitigate high operational and fuel costs.
Future Planning & Capital Allocation
The company is raising ₹400 crore in fresh capital to fund its aggressive fleet expansion. Specifically, ₹167 crore will be deployed to purchase 65 Volvo FMX 500E Dump Trucks, 11 Komatsu/Volvo excavators/dozers, and other heavy machinery. Another ₹208 crore will be used to prepay/repay existing high-cost borrowings to deleverage the balance sheet.
Source: RHP p. 542, 666, 670Competitive Position
Caliber Mining operates as a dominant contractor in Central India. It has rapidly captured a 6.5% market share of Coal India's total contractual OB removal (reaching 18.4% share in WCL and 17.2% in NCL). Its deep integration of both mining extraction and end-to-end logistics (including rake loading) gives it a structural margin advantage over fragmented, pure-play logistics competitors.
Source: RHP p. 734Execution / Track Record
The company has demonstrated explosive growth, scaling its revenue from operations from ₹953 crore in FY24 to ₹1,677 crore in FY26 (a 32.7% CAGR). Concurrently, its OB removal volume surged from 72 million cubic meters (Mcum) in FY24 to 131 Mcum in FY26. It maintains an industry-leading ROE of 27.78%.
Source: RHP p. 727, 741Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership
Leadership & Skin in the Game
Leadership: Mohit Satishkumar Chadda
Litigation: Against Promoters: ₹163.08 lakhs (Direct Tax) and 2 criminal proceedings. Against Company: ₹69.26 lakhs (Indirect Tax) and 4 criminal proceedings. Against Directors: ₹112.49 lakhs (Direct Tax).
Auditor / RPT Flags: No audit qualifications in the last three years. However, related party transactions are significant, including a ₹17.70 crore corporate guarantee provided on behalf of a related party (Shree Chadda Roadlines) and substantial transport sub-contracting revenues routed through promoter-held KSR Freight Carriers.
Peers & Valuation
| Company | P/E | P/B | RoE | Margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Power Mech Projects Limited | 22.94 | — | 15.9 | — |
| NCC Limited | 13.59 | — | 9.02 | — |
| Sindhu Trade Links Limited | 97.15 | — | 2.54 | — |
| Dilip Buildcon Limited | 4.95 | — | 20.09 | — |
At the ₹424 upper band, the issue is priced at 14.4x earnings — a 58% discount to the peer median of 34.7x. This is the arithmetic of the price band against the peers the filing itself lists; it is not a view on whether the offer is worth taking.
🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say
Findings from across the filing — the notes, MD&A, related-party disclosures, contingent liabilities, CARO and litigation, alongside the risk section itself. Each carries where it was found, so you can see which were buried and which were disclosed. Findings marked derived are computed from the filed numbers against a stated rule, shown beside them.
In FY26, the top 10 customers accounted for 98.40% of revenue from operations, and the top 3 customers contributed 90.11%. The single largest customer, Northern Coalfields Limited, contributed 44.16%.
RHP p. 28, 893-894The company failed to appoint a Whole-Time Company Secretary for roughly 19 months (Dec 2022 to Jul 2024). Furthermore, in a Sept 2024 private placement, the company utilized funds before filing the required PAS-3 form and failed to open a separate bank account, leading to RoC levying a penalty of ₹5 lakhs on the company and ₹4.67 lakhs on each director.
RHP p. 576-578Promoters operate a partnership firm, KSR Freight Carriers, in the exact same line of business. KSR Freight Carriers was awarded transportation work and sub-contracted it to the company, generating ₹8,382.82 lakhs (5.00% of revenue) in FY26. Furthermore, the company has extended a corporate guarantee of ₹1,770.09 lakhs for Shree Chadda Roadlines.
RHP p. 604, 638, 642The company reported negative cash flows from investing activities of ₹69,192.19 lakhs in FY26 and ₹15,740.50 lakhs in FY25.
RHP p. 597Against Promoters: ₹163.08 lakhs (Direct Tax) and 2 criminal proceedings. Against Company: ₹69.26 lakhs (Indirect Tax) and 4 criminal proceedings. Against Directors: ₹112.49 lakhs (Direct Tax).
RHP p. 588-589, 638, 642, 724, 770No audit qualifications in the last three years. However, related party transactions are significant, including a ₹17.70 crore corporate guarantee provided on behalf of a related party (Shree Chadda Roadlines) and substantial transport sub-contracting revenues routed through promoter-held KSR Freight Carriers.
RHP p. 588-589, 638, 642, 724, 770Short-term borrowings of ₹358.94 cr against cash of ₹7.37 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is comfortable only while lenders stay comfortable.
rule: cash < 0.5x short-term debtCompany's Claims vs Reality
We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.
Does the balance sheet support this heavy asset base?
RHP p. 725, 861Do the peer comparison tables validate this?
RHP p. 741-742Proprietary SWOT — Company-Specific
Strengths
- End-to-end integrated mining and logistics solutions supported by a massive owned fleet of 1,911 vehicles and heavy machinery.
- Strong in-house maintenance infrastructure and workshops, significantly reducing operating costs (like High-Speed Diesel) and enhancing margins compared to peers.
- Robust unexecuted Order Book of ₹9,55,089.08 lakhs as of May 15, 2026, providing high medium-term revenue visibility.
Weaknesses
- Highly capital-intensive operations requiring continuous debt-funded fleet additions, resulting in a leveraged balance sheet (Net Debt/Equity ratio of 1.62x in FY26).
- Severe customer concentration, with the top 3 customers driving over 90% of total revenue.
Opportunities
- State-run Coal India Limited (CIL) is aggressively outsourcing overburden (OB) removal to private contractors to meet production targets, expanding the addressable market.
- Diversification into other mineral logistics, including iron ore and manganese, to reduce dependency purely on thermal coal.
Threats (material, not boilerplate)
- Termination of mining contracts due to failure to meet prescribed daily extraction targets or operation parameters. risk_section
Why it matters: Contracts with WCL and NCL are standard-form and favor the PSUs, allowing them to terminate or levy heavy penalties for missed targets, which would immediately hit the company's cash flow. - Global and national transition towards renewable energy sources away from thermal coal. risk_section
Why it matters: A structural decline in thermal coal demand in India would directly reduce coal extraction volumes, potentially stranding the company's massive fleet of specialized mining assets.
Live Subscription Status
Total subscription is fed live from the exchange data feed. The category split (QIB, NII, retail) is not carried by that feed and is added by hand where it is material — so it is shown only when we have actually verified it, rather than left as blanks.
Allotment Status
Check your allotment on the registrar's portal → Registrar: KFin Technologies
Allotment is decided by the registrar, not by us and not by the exchange. In an oversubscribed retail book, allotment is by lottery, so a large application does not improve your odds beyond one lot. If money stays blocked after the refund date, the mandate expiry (01 Sep 2026) is the date to raise with your bank.
Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions
Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.
Where is the money going?
The Offer comprises a Fresh Issue of ₹400.00 crore and an Offer for Sale of ₹50.00 crore. From the fresh proceeds, ₹208.00 crore will be utilized for prepayment/repayment of existing borrowings, and ₹167.00 crore will fund capital expenditure to purchase new commercial vehicles, plant, and machinery.
RHP p. 542, 666How concentrated is the customer base?
The customer base is extremely concentrated. In FY26, the top 10 customers accounted for 98.40% of revenue from operations, while the top 3 customers accounted for 90.11%. The single largest customer, Northern Coalfields Limited, contributed 44.16% of total revenue.
RHP p. 893-894Is it profitable and growing?
Yes. Revenue from operations grew rapidly from ₹953.11 crore in FY24 to ₹1,677.66 crore in FY26. Profit After Tax (PAT) similarly grew from ₹95.90 crore in FY24 to ₹157.90 crore in FY26, supporting an Operating EBITDA margin of 25.69% in FY26.
RHP p. 850, 866What sits in the footnotes / contingent liabilities?
The company carries ₹458.53 crore in contingent liabilities as of FY26. The vast majority (₹440.13 crore) is bank guarantees provided for business purposes. However, it also includes a ₹17.70 crore corporate guarantee given on behalf of a related party, Shree Chadda Roadlines. The company also faced RoC penalties for severe compliance lapses regarding private placement procedures in late 2024.
RHP p. 576-578, 638What Earlier Investors Paid
Early capital takes real risk and is fairly rewarded for it — a large multiple built over many years is normal. What deserves a closer look is a steep step-up in a short window: a round priced cheaply only months before the offer.
| Shareholder | Priced at | When | vs IPO price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abakkus Four2eight Opportunities Fund | ₹240.00 | 2024-09-30 | 1.8x |
| Anchorage Capital Fund – Anchorage Capital Scheme III | ₹424.00 | 2026-06-17 | 1.0x |
| Baring Private Equity India Fund 6 | ₹424.00 | 2026-06-27 | 1.0x |
| Scarlet Ventures LLP | ₹424.00 | 2026-06-27 | 1.0x |
| Anuj A Sheth | ₹424.00 | 2026-06-27 | 1.0x |
| Maithili Gagan Chaturvedi | ₹424.00 | 2026-06-27 | 1.0x |
Prices are as stated in the filing’s allotment history and are not adjusted for later bonus issues or share splits. Where a company has issued bonus shares, the multiples above understate the true return and can even read as losses. Adjusting for that is on our list; until it is done we would rather show the raw disclosure and tell you its limits than publish a confident number that is wrong.
Lock-in Expiry Calendar
Shares held before the IPO cannot be sold immediately; they unlock in tranches. When a tranche unlocks, more shares become eligible to trade. Retail investors are frequently caught unaware by these dates. The schedule below follows from the listing date; quantities are shown only where the filing discloses them.
- 24 Jul 2029Minimum Promoter’s Contributionthree years
- 24 Jul 2027Promoters' shareholding in excess of 20%one year
- 24 Jan 2027Entire pre-Offer Equity Share Capitalsix months
- 23 Aug 2026Anchor Investors (50%)30 days
- 22 Oct 2026Anchor Investors (50%)90 days
An unlock means more shares may be sold — not that they will be, and not that the price will move. We state the dates; what you do with them is your call.
What Changed Between the DRHP and the RHP
Companies file a draft prospectus, then a final one. The changes in between are rarely reported, and they can be revealing.
| Item | In the DRHP | In the RHP / Addendum |
|---|---|---|
| Total issue size and structure The total issue size was reduced by 25%. The fresh issue was reduced by ₹10,000.00 lakhs following Pre-IPO placements, and the Offer for Sale was cut in half, with all four selling promoters halving their offered shares. | Up to ₹60,000.00 lakhs (Fresh Issue up to ₹50,000.00 lakhs, Offer for Sale up to ₹10,000.00 lakhs) | Up to ₹45,000.00 lakhs (Fresh Issue up to ₹40,000.00 lakhs, Offer for Sale up to ₹5,000.00 lakhs) |
| Pre-IPO Placement The company completed pre-IPO placements totaling ₹10,000.00 lakhs prior to the RHP filing, which directly reduced the size of the fresh issue. | Company may consider a Pre-IPO Placement aggregating up to ₹10,000.00 lakhs | Company undertook Pre-IPO Placements aggregating to ₹6,000.00 lakhs and ₹4,000.00 lakhs |
| Use of Proceeds (Fresh Issue) The allocation for debt repayment increased by ₹3,300 lakhs, while the allocation for capital expenditure was reduced by ₹3,300 lakhs. | Repayment/prepayment of borrowings: ₹17,500 lakhs; Capital expenditure: ₹20,000 lakhs | Repayment/prepayment of borrowings: ₹20,800.00 lakhs; Capital expenditure: ₹16,700.00 lakhs |
| Financial Information Period The restated financial statements were rolled forward by two full fiscal years, dropping FY22, FY23, and the stub period, and introducing full-year data for FY25 and FY26. | Three-months ended June 30, 2024, and Fiscals 2024, 2023, and 2022 | Fiscals 2026, 2025, and 2024 |
| Contingent Liabilities Contingent liabilities increased by roughly 213% (over ₹31,000 lakhs), primarily driven by a substantial increase in bank guarantees issued for business purposes. | ₹14,614.15 lakhs (as of June 30, 2024) | ₹45,853.34 lakhs (as of March 31, 2026) |
Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.