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Augmont Enterprises IPO GMP, Key Details and Forensic Analysis

Augmont Enterprises

MAINBOARD IPO · NSE, BSE · ✅ LISTED
FINMINUTES IPO SCORE 71/100 provisional · components pending
₹750–788
Price Band
Issue ₹825 cr · Lot 19

FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge

Augmont Enterprises Limited operates as an integrated gold and silver platform in India, serving both businesses and consumers across 24 states. The company integrates physical infrastructure with digital distribution through its two core online platforms, 'Augmont SPOT' and 'Augmont Gold For All'.

What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾

Incorporated in 2012 and headquartered in Mumbai, Maharashtra, Augmont Enterprises Limited is a leading integrated player in India's precious metals sector. The company's unique full-stack model spans the entire value chain from procurement and refining (operating two refineries in Rudrapur and Mumbai with a combined capacity of 284 MTPA) to bullion trading, digital gold offerings, coin retailing, and gold-backed financial services. Augmont operates two primary online platforms: 'Augmont SPOT', an electronic, over-the-counter delivery-based bullion trading platform launched in 2012 for B2B jewellers, manufacturers, and bullion dealers; and 'Augmont Gold For All', a consumer-focused digital gold and silver platform launched in Fiscal 2021 that enables micro-savings, gold systematic investment plans (SIPs), and gold-backed loans. The company has a physical presence with 20 spot delivery centers and 106 Sell-Old-Gold retail branches as of March 31, 2026. In terms of scale, Augmont's consolidated revenue from operations grew at a CAGR of 64.23% from ₹34,921.49 crore (₹3,49,214.93 million) in Fiscal 2024 to ₹94,186.21 crore (₹9,41,862.12 million) in Fiscal 2026, and restated consolidated Profit After Tax (PAT) reached ₹348.30 crore (₹3,483.00 million) in Fiscal 2026.

  • Enterprise Sales via Augmont SPOT platform — Represents the B2B online bullion trading operations of gold and silver bars with assured physical delivery across 20 delivery centers, contributing ₹81,750.57 crore (₹817,505.69 million) or 86.80% of consolidated revenue from operations in Fiscal 2026.
  • Consumer-Focused Offerings via Augmont Gold For All platform — Includes digital gold/silver transactions, fractional gold and silver coin sales, EMI jewellery purchases, and gold loan technology support, contributing ₹6,687.24 crore (₹66,872.36 million) or 7.10% of consolidated revenue from operations in Fiscal 2026.
  • International Sales — Consists of manufacturing and selling gold jewellery articles, primarily chains, from its unit in Sitapur SEZ, Jaipur to international markets, contributing ₹5,701.49 crore (₹57,014.86 million) or 6.05% of consolidated revenue from operations in Fiscal 2026.
  • Other Sales — Includes sale of platinum, income from job work, and other gold-allied services, contributing ₹46.92 crore (₹469.21 million) or 0.05% of consolidated revenue from operations in Fiscal 2026.
Moat / Edge

Augmont's primary competitive moat is its unique full-stack backward integration, combining physical refining operations (with a combined 284 MTPA capacity) and secure vaulting facilities with scalable digital B2B and B2C platforms. This integrated structure provides end-to-end control across the value chain, enabling real-time automated price discovery, lower sourcing costs, and a highly capital-efficient operating model that is difficult for unintegrated competitors to replicate. Its moat is further supported by an extensive distribution ecosystem, including 218 digital partners, 20 physical spot delivery hubs, and a registered consumer base exceeding 49.62 million.

The Offer

2026-08-21 – 2026-08-25
₹750–788
19
—
₹825 cr
₹620 cr
₹205 cr
NSE, BSE

Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds

  • Funding future working capital requirements towards procurement, maintenance and scaling up of inventory and funding advance margin requirements for procurement of inventory by our Company — ₹465.00 cr
  • General corporate purposes

Valuation at the Offer Price

19.5xour arithmetic, on latest restated EPS
38.4%
₹111.0

The filing does not print a single headline multiple, so this one is ours: the upper band divided by the latest restated earnings per share — the same arithmetic the “Basis for the Offer Price” section performs. It is struck on pre-issue earnings; where the issue creates new shares, the post-issue multiple is computed in the workings below. This filing names no comparable listed peer, so there is no peer table and no relative multiple on this page. We would rather say that than assemble a peer set the issuer did not stand behind.

FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built

Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures and what it is worth. Components with no disclosed input are dropped from the weighting entirely rather than held at an invented neutral, because a constant inside a weighted average is not neutral — it quietly drags every score toward the middle. Weighted across 4 live components.

Score coverage 70%

70% of the designed weighting had real data behind it on this issue. Not yet scored here: Anchor Quality, Valuation Vs Peers. A lower coverage figure does not mean a worse company — it means we are standing behind less of the picture, and you should read the findings below rather than the headline number.

70/100
How this is measured12%

Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.

75/100
How this is measured32%

Driven by the models battery run on the filing's own restated numbers: the Piotroski fundamental tests (scored out of those we could actually run), the Altman Z-double-prime solvency zone, and the direction of profit across the disclosed period. It is not a single yes/no on last year's profit.

75/100
How this is measured6%

A proxy for syndicate strength, based today only on how many lead managers are on the issue: 75 where three or more banks are involved, 60 otherwise. We have not built a bank-by-bank track record, so treat this as a rough signal. When the filing does not disclose the syndicate, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than guessed.

64/100
How this is measured28%

Starts at 100 and loses points for every material finding: 12 for a flagged finding, 4 for a noted one. Two kinds feed it. DERIVED findings are computed from the filed numbers against stated thresholds — operating cash negative while profit is positive, related-party revenue above 15% of total, revenue rising while profit falls, goodwill above 30% of net worth, receivables growing more than 1.3x faster than sales, cash below half of short-term debt. Those are reproducible: the same filing gives the same answer every time, and the rule is printed beside the finding. READ findings come from the forensic sweep of the notes. Contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications, statutory dues, promoter funding. Findings that record the ABSENCE of a problem — no litigation pending, an unmodified audit opinion — deduct nothing. This is the component our forensic read drives directly, and it moves most between companies.

3-Year Financial & Growth Trend

Metric FY26FY25FY24
Revenue (₹ Cr) 94186.21266230.77934921.493
Net Profit (₹ Cr) 348.3227.18875.966
PAT Margin 0.37%0.34%0.22%

Revenue Breakdown

  • Enterprise Sales via Augmont SPOT platform: 86.8%
  • Consumer-focused Offerings via Augmont Gold For All platform: 7.1%
  • International Sales: 6.05%
  • Other Sales: 0.05%

Market Context

NOT part of the FinMinutes Score

The Score above is what the filing says. Everything in this box is what the crowd says. We keep them apart on purpose — every other site blends the two and calls the result a rating. Demand is real information, but it is information about the market, not about the company, and it changes by the hour while the company does not.

100/100from live subscription
122.9xsubscribed
—xbids land late
—x 
The book is running ahead of the filing.

The market is bidding this issue enthusiastically. The headline financials look strong, but our forensic read of the filing is not clean — the risk band is high and the footnotes carry material flags. That gap is the fact worth noticing. Strong demand is information about the market; the flags are information about the company, and the two are not saying the same thing here. Read the Forensic Findings below before the momentum decides it for you.

Subscription is low early in a book and high at the end, because most bids arrive in the final hours. A number read on day one says more about the clock than the company — which is precisely why it is not in the Score. GMP is unofficial, unregulated, and easily moved. Neither is a recommendation.

Applying, and Who Handles the Allotment

Cut-off price₹788.00
Minimum retail application₹14,972

Check allotment status on the registrar’s own portal → We link the registrar directly rather than mirroring the form.

Deep Financials

Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.

Income StatementThe profit and loss as filed, then what we derive from it — kept apart.

Statutory order, exactly as restated in the filing. Finance cost and depreciation sit inside Total Expenses under Ind AS, which is why they are listed among the expense lines here rather than below the total. The expense rows sum to the total. Rows the filing does not disclose separately are omitted rather than left blank.

Income Statement — as filed (₹ Cr)FY26FY25FY24
Revenue from Operations94,186.2166,230.7834,921.49
Other Income96.2621.2727.40
Total Income94,282.4766,252.0534,948.90
Cost of Materials Consumed93,605.4865,798.8134,780.45
Employee Benefit Expense29.2523.9720.69
Finance Cost1.8511.9418.55
Depreciation & Amortisation7.268.148.42
Other Expenses165.54103.8179.63
Total Expenses93,809.3765,946.7734,844.55
Profit Before Tax473.10305.28104.35
Tax Expense124.8078.0928.38
Profit After Tax348.30227.1975.97
EPS - Basic40.4526.899.08
EPS - Diluted40.4526.899.08

Below this line the figures are ours, not the filing's. Ind AS has no EBITDA or EBIT line. We reconstruct them from disclosed items — EBIT as profit before tax plus finance cost, less any exceptional item and share of associate profit sitting below the operating line; EBITDA as EBIT plus depreciation. The working is in the Formula Notebook.

Derived by us (₹ Cr)FY26FY25FY24
EBITDA385.95304.09103.92
EBIT378.69295.9495.50
Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.
Balance Sheet (₹ Cr)FY26FY25FY24
Share Capital41.754.504.50
Reserves & Surplus865.14398.46180.39
Net Worth906.89402.96184.89
Long-term Borrowings1.124.660.65
Short-term Borrowings11.5616.8954.22
Total Borrowings12.6721.5454.86
Trade Payables69.1395.03136.89
Current Liabilities316.681,435.11566.47
Total Liabilities324.231,442.65573.09
Property, Plant & Equipment23.7222.0920.52
Capital Work in Progress—0.130.13
Intangible Assets0.521.362.30
Investments19.5625.448.87
Inventories341.93264.1857.98
Trade Receivables181.7438.44105.08
Cash & Equivalents86.89173.61176.19
Current Assets1,199.971,788.63715.05
Total Assets1,256.981,857.31760.29
Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.
Cash Flow (₹ Cr)FY26FY25FY24
Net Cash from Operating Activities-42.16105.4596.74
Capital Expenditure1.0815.376.59
Net Cash from Investing Activities-51.27-61.02168.43
Net Cash from Financing Activities6.71-47.01-159.86
Net Change in Cash-86.72-2.58105.31
Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.

Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.

RatioFY26FY25FY24
Profitability
EBITDA Margin (%)0.40.50.3
EBIT Margin (%)0.40.40.3
PAT Margin (%)0.40.30.2
Return on Equity (%)38.456.441.1
Return on Capital Employed (%)41.269.739.8
Return on Assets (%)27.712.210
Leverage
Debt / Equity (x)0.010.050.3
Net Debt / EBITDA (x)-0.19-0.5-1.17
Interest Coverage (x)204.3724.795.15
Liquidity
Current Ratio (x)3.791.251.26
Quick Ratio (x)2.711.061.16
Efficiency
Asset Turnover (x)74.9335.6645.93
Receivable Days101
Inventory Days111
Payable Days011
Cash Conversion Cycle (days)201
Quality of Earnings
Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x)-0.120.461.27
Accruals Ratio (%)31.16.6-2.7
Capex / Depreciation (x)0.151.890.78
Inventory and payable days are measured against cost of goods (materials consumed + purchases of stock-in-trade + change in inventories). Receivable days against revenue.
DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.

A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.

ComponentFY26FY25FY24
Net Margin (PAT / Revenue)0.4%0.3%0.2%
Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets)74.93x35.66x45.93x
Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth)1.39x4.61x4.11x
= Return on Equity38.4%56.4%41.1%
Tax Burden (PAT / PBT)0.74x0.74x0.73x
Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT)1.25x1.03x1.09x
Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue)0.4%0.4%0.3%

Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.

Quality of EarningsWhat the statements say when you read them against each other.

What the statements say once you read them against each other. These are observations, not verdicts — every one is arithmetic on the numbers the company itself disclosed, and each is stated so you can go and check it in the filing.

  • In FY26 the company reported a profit of 348.30 cr while operating cash flow was NEGATIVE at -42.16 cr. Reported earnings did not convert into cash. This is the single divergence most worth understanding in any set of accounts, and the filing is the place to look for why.
  • Between FY24 and FY26 revenue grew 170% while profit grew 358%. Profit expanding at several times the rate of revenue is not automatically a concern — operating leverage does exactly this — but it is worth confirming from the filing whether the gap comes from genuine margin expansion or from one-off items.
  • Interest coverage was 204.37x in FY26. Debt servicing is comfortably covered by operating profit.
Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman, Piotroski and the Montier C-score — plus our own final-year check.

Beneish M-Score

M = 1.77

An eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.

ComponentValueWhat it captures
DSRI
Days Sales in Receivables Index
(Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1)
3.325Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection.
GMI
Gross Margin Index
GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t
1.058Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate.
AQI
Asset Quality Index
AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets
1.056Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here.
SGI
Sales Growth Index
Sales_t / Sales_t-1
1.422Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going.
DEPI
Depreciation Index
DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE)
1.15Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit.
SGAI
SG&A Index
(SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses
1.072A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure.
LVGI
Leverage Index
Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets
0.326Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers.
TATA
Total Accruals to Total Assets
(PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets
0.3106The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash.

M = 1.77, above the −1.78 threshold. On this model the accounts merit closer reading. That is a prompt to go to the filing, not a conclusion about it.

Altman Z″-Score (emerging markets)

Z″ = 15.07 · Safe

A distress-prediction model. We use the Z″ variant deliberately: the original Z was calibrated on American manufacturers and misleads badly on Indian services companies. Above 2.6 is the safe zone, 1.1 to 2.6 is grey, below 1.1 is the distress zone. Like every model of its kind it is a screen, not a prophecy.

X1 — Working Capital / Total Assets0.703
X2 — Reserves / Total Assets0.688
X3 — EBIT / Total Assets0.301
X4 — Net Worth / Total Liabilities2.797
Z″ = 3.25 + 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X415.07

X2 is meant to read retained earnings. The filing reports Other Equity, which also holds securities premium paid in by investors, so X2 here runs on reserves and reads higher than true retained earnings would. The more premium the company has raised before listing, the more Z″ is flattered.

Piotroski F-Score (adapted)

5 / 8

Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it.

  • ✓Positive return on assets
  • ✗Positive operating cash flow
  • ✓Return on assets improving
  • ✗Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
  • ✓Long-term leverage decreasing
  • ✓Current ratio improving
  • ✗Gross margin improving
  • ✓Asset turnover improving

Montier C-Score

3 of 6 signs

Six yes-or-no signs that reported profit may be running ahead of the business, from James Montier’s 2008 screen, read here for FY26 against FY25. Each is a direction in the statements, not a judgement. Several together are a reason to read the accounting policies and notes closely; none on its own means anything is wrong, and growing companies trip some of them honestly.

  • ●Gap between profit and operating cash flow widening · PAT − CFO: ₹121.7 cr in FY25, ₹390.5 cr in FY26
  • ●Receivable days rising · 0 days in FY25, 1 days in FY26
  • ○Inventory days rising · 1 days in FY25, 1 days in FY26 (on cost of goods)
  • ○Other current assets rising against revenue · 2.0% of revenue in FY25, 0.6% in FY26 (current assets less cash, receivables and inventory)
  • ●Depreciation falling against fixed assets · 36.9% of net block in FY25, 30.6% in FY26
  • ○Total assets growing more than 10% a year · -32.3% in FY26

The Final-Year Check

ours

Not from any textbook. The hockey stick in the last year before a filing is the oldest pattern in this business, and nobody publishes it. So we measure it: how the final disclosed year compares with the years behind it. Real acceleration looks exactly the same on the page as a flattering one — which is precisely why it is worth naming rather than assuming either way.

  • Cash conversion fell sharply in the final year: operating cash flow was -0.12x profit in FY26, against 0.46x in FY25. Profit rose; the cash behind it did not follow at the same rate.

Ratios Nobody Prints

  • Contingent liabilities / Net worth: 1.7%
    Contingent liabilities of 15.06 cr against a net worth of 906.89 cr — 1.7% of what the company is worth on paper. These are obligations that sit off the balance sheet but could land on it. What they consist of matters as much as the size: a corporate guarantee to a subsidiary is a different animal from a disputed tax demand, and the filing says which.
  • Related-party revenue / Total revenue: 27.5%
    27.5% of revenue in FY26 came from entities connected to the promoters. Revenue you sell to yourself is not the same as revenue you won in the market.
  • Cash / Short-term borrowings: 7.52x
    Short-term borrowings of 11.56 cr against cash of 86.89 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is only comfortable while lenders stay comfortable.
  • Promoter remuneration / PAT: 0.4%
    Managerial remuneration to the promoter group was 1.26 cr against a profit of 348.30 cr. This is a legitimate cost — but it is also a route by which value leaves a company before it ever reaches a minority shareholder.
What the Price RequiresThe profit the offer price needs, at three hurdle rates. A restatement of the price, not a view on it.

At the upper band of ₹788.00, the market value is ₹6,785 cr. A buyer who wants a given return each year from a business that never grows needs annual profit of market value × that return. The three rates are round hurdle rates, not this company’s cost of capital, so pick the one that is yours. The years columns assume profit compounds from the FY26 figure and the price stands still. None of this is a forecast, a fair value or a target.

Hurdle rateProfit the price needs× FY26 profitYears at 15% growthYears at 25% growth
10% a year₹679 cr1.9x4.83.0
12% a year₹814 cr2.3x6.13.8
14% a year₹950 cr2.7x7.24.5
  • Earnings yield at the upper band: 5.13% (FY26 profit ÷ market value).
  • Free cash flow yield: -0.64% (operating cash flow less capital expenditure, −₹43.2 cr, ÷ market value).
The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.

Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.

Profitability
Return on Equity (ROE)38.4%
FormulaPAT ÷ Net Worth
Worked348.30 ÷ 906.89

What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.

Return on Capital Employed (ROCE)41.2%
FormulaEBIT ÷ (Net Worth + Total Borrowings)
Worked378.69 ÷ (906.89 + 12.67) = 378.69 ÷ 919.56

Return on ALL the capital in the business, borrowed as well as owned. Unlike ROE, it cannot be flattered by taking on debt.

EBITDA Margin0.4%
FormulaEBITDA ÷ Revenue
Worked385.95 ÷ 94,186.21

Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.

Leverage
Debt to Equity0.01x
FormulaTotal Borrowings ÷ Net Worth
Worked12.67 ÷ 906.89

How much the company has borrowed against what it owns. High is not automatically bad — ask whether the borrowing is being serviced comfortably.

Interest Coverage204.37x
FormulaEBIT ÷ Finance Cost
Worked378.69 ÷ 1.85

How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.

Efficiency
Receivable Days1 days
Formula(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365
Worked(181.74 ÷ 94,186.21) × 365

How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.

Cash Conversion Cycle2 days
FormulaInventory Days + Receivable Days − Payable Days
Worked1 + 1 − 0

How long cash is tied up in the operating cycle before it comes back. The longer it is, the more working capital the business must fund.

Quality of Earnings
Operating Cash Flow to Profit-0.12x
FormulaCash from Operations ÷ PAT
Worked-42.16 ÷ 348.30

Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.

Accruals Ratio31.1%
Formula(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets
Worked(348.30 − -42.16) ÷ 1,256.98 = 390.46 ÷ 1,256.98

The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.

Valuation at the Offer Price
Market Capitalisation (at the top of the band)₹6,785.18 cr
FormulaPrice × Post-issue Shares
Worked₹788.00 × 86,106,304 shares

What the whole company is being valued at, if the issue prices at the top of the band.

Enterprise Value (EV)₹6,710.95 cr
FormulaMarket Cap + Total Borrowings − Cash
Worked6,785.18 + 12.67 − 86.89

What it would actually cost to buy the whole business: you take on its debt and you get its cash. This is the number a buyer cares about, and it is the reason a P/E on its own can mislead.

EV / EBITDA17.39x
FormulaEnterprise Value ÷ EBITDA
Worked6,710.95 ÷ 385.95

The multiple that includes debt. Two companies on the same P/E — one debt-free, one heavily borrowed — are not the same investment, and only this number tells you so.

Price / Earnings (P/E)19.48x
FormulaMarket Cap ÷ PAT
Worked6,785.18 ÷ 348.30

The familiar multiple. Useful, but blind to debt — read it alongside EV/EBITDA, never instead of it.

Return on Invested Capital (ROIC)33.5%
FormulaEBIT × (1 − tax rate) ÷ (Net Worth + Debt − Cash)
WorkedNOPAT ÷ Invested Capital

What the business earns on the capital actually at work in it. We do not compare this to a cost of capital: that would need a beta, an unlisted company has none, and inventing one would be theatre.

Earnings yield at the upper band5.13%
FormulaLatest full-year PAT ÷ market value
Worked₹348.30 cr ÷ ₹6,785.18 cr

The P/E turned upside down: what each rupee of market value earns today. Set it against what you could earn elsewhere; the gap is what growth has to make up.

Free cash flow yield at the upper band-0.64%
Formula(Operating cash flow − capital expenditure) ÷ market value
Worked₹-43.24 cr ÷ ₹6,785.18 cr

Cash left after the company pays for its own investment, against the price of the whole company. Profit can be shaped by accounting choices; this is harder to shape.

Trailing PEG — read the caveat0.37 (on 53.3% trailing growth)
FormulaP/E ÷ trailing PAT growth (%)
Worked19.48 ÷ 53.3%

PEG was designed for FORWARD growth. This one uses TRAILING growth, because that is all a prospectus gives us — and the final year before an IPO is very often the best year the company will have for a while. A low PEG here may say more about the timing of the filing than about the price. We show it because it was asked for; we show the growth denominator beside it so it cannot mislead you quietly.

Workspace

The post-issue share count is stated as “[•]” in this filing until final pricing, so we derive it: profit after tax divided by earnings per share gives the pre-issue count, and the fresh issue divided by the offer price gives the new shares. Everything below rests on that derivation. It is close, not exact.

The numbers are already loaded. Move the offer price and watch every multiple move with it. Set your own growth and margin and see what they imply two years out. These are your assumptions, not our forecast — we have no view on what this company will earn, and the moment we published one we would be doing something we are not registered to do. What we can do is put the arithmetic in front of you and get out of the way.

Price defaults to the top of the band. Margin defaults to what the company actually reported in FY26.

Market capitalisation—
Enterprise value—
P / E—
EV / EBITDA—
EV / Sales—
On your assumptions, two years out
Revenue—
EBITDA—
Implied forward EV / EBITDA—
What the price is assuming
Free-cash growth priced in, 10 yrs—
Years to earn back the market cap—

Projections are arithmetic on the inputs you typed. They are not a forecast, not a recommendation, and not a view on whether this offer is worth taking. Educational only.

Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive

Industry Overview (p. 193, 194, 198)

According to the Technopak Report, India's gold and silver sector is undergoing rapid formalization, driven by regulatory shifts like mandatory hallmarking, GST, and digitized financial ecosystems. In Fiscal 2025, India's gold and silver jewellery retail market reached approximately ₹6,44,800.00 crore (₹6,448 billion), growing at a CAGR of 13.10% from ₹3,48,700.00 crore in Fiscal 2020, and is projected to scale to ₹16,48,100.00 crore by Fiscal 2030 (CAGR of 20.60%). Complementing this, the bullion trading market (comprising bars, coins, and collectibles) expanded from ₹94,900.00 crore in Fiscal 2020 to ₹2,16,000.00 crore in Fiscal 2025, and grew year-on-year at 98.40% to reach ₹4,28,500.00 crore in Fiscal 2026E, with projections to reach ₹8,76,800.00 crore by Fiscal 2030 (19.60% CAGR), as investors increasingly look to precious metals as an inflation hedge.

₹4,28,500.00 crore (for Indian Bullion Trading Market in Fiscal 2026E, and ₹6,44,800.00 crore for Gold and Silver Jewellery Retail Market in Fiscal 2025) 19.60% CAGR (Fiscal 2026E to Fiscal 2030P) for the Indian Bullion Trading Market
Future Planning & Capital Allocation

Augmont is directing ₹465.00 crore (75.00% of the Fresh Issue proceeds) to fund its incremental working capital and margin requirements to scale up physical bullion procurement. The remaining portion of the ₹620.00 crore Fresh Issue is allocated to general corporate purposes and Offer expenses, ensuring a lean capital structure with low long-term debt (total borrowings of only ₹12.67 crore as of FY26).

Source: p. 128, 130, 321
Competitive Position

The company maintains a highly distinctive competitive position by combining physical infrastructure (two refineries, 20 spot delivery centers, and 106 Gold-For-All centers) with its proprietary online B2B platform. While other players operate regionally, Augmont's technology-driven price discovery mechanism and India Good Delivery (IGD) certification on the BSE and MCX act as powerful barriers to entry.

Source: p. 221, 233, 541
Execution Track Record

Led by Ketan Kothari and the Kothari family, the company has scaled revenues aggressively from ₹34,921.49 crore in Fiscal 2024 to ₹94,186.21 crore in Fiscal 2026 (CAGR of 64.23%). Consolidated PAT has grown at a 114.13% CAGR to reach ₹348.30 crore in Fiscal 2026, accompanied by exceptional capital efficiency (RoNW of 55.25% in Fiscal 2026).

Source: p. 320, 554, 557

Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership

92.75% → —%
0%
—%
—
Nuvama Wealth Management Limited, Intensive Fiscal Services Private Limited, JM Financial Limited, Motilal Oswal Investment Advisors Limited
MUFG Intime India Private Limited (Formerly Link Intime India Private Limited)

Leadership & Skin in the Game

Leadership: Bishon Bihari Singh (Chief Executive Officer)

Litigation: Outstanding direct tax proceeding against the company u/s AY 2017-18 consists of 1 case involving ₹0.658 crore under appeal before the Income Tax Department. Outstanding customs/indirect tax proceedings against the company include 1 customs case u/s Customs Act 1962 of ₹1.383 crore, 1 customs case over gold doré purity of ₹1.476 crore, 1 GST penalty case of ₹0.116 crore, 1 bank account attachment of ₹1.525 crore, 1 GST ITC penalty case of ₹1.638 crore, 1 GST ITC denial of ₹7.322 crore, and 1 GST excess ITC claim of ₹0.918 crore (totaling ₹13.510 crore across 8 cases against taxation authorities). Active civil disputes initiated by the company include 4 material cases totaling ₹58.239 crore, including Commercial Summary Suit No. 180 of 2017. Criminal cases initiated by the company include 1 miscellaneous application against Eskaybee International Private Limited (unquantified) and 1 cyber fraud complaint involving ₹3.601 crore where the bank account was temporarily frozen. Criminal case u/s Section 138/142 of NI Act filed by subsidiary AGTPL against Mr. Senthil N V (proprietor of R S Jewel Tech) involves a cheque dishonour of ₹1.225 crore.

Auditor / RPT Flags: Statutory auditors issued an unmodified opinion but included an Emphasis of Matter regarding the restatement of prior periods for the common control acquisition of AGTPL under Ind AS 103 and Ind AS 8. Additionally, under Rule 11(g), auditors noted that for subsidiary AGTPL, they were unable to comment on whether the database-level edit log (audit trail) feature of the accounting software was enabled due to a lack of database-level audit evidence.

🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say

Findings from across the filing — the notes, MD&A, related-party disclosures, contingent liabilities, CARO and litigation, alongside the risk section itself. Each carries where it was found, so you can see which were buried and which were disclosed. Findings marked derived are computed from the filed numbers against a stated rule, shown beside them.

Extraordinary Related Party Bullion and Financing Transactions with RSBL where: rpt flagged

In Fiscal 2026, Augmont recorded purchases of ₹5,953.58 crore and sales of ₹25,826.31 crore with its promoter group company Riddisiddhi Bullions Limited. It also gave loans of ₹6,741.88 crore and received back ₹6,629.19 crore from RSBL in FY26, with an outstanding loan receivable of ₹113.98 crore as of March 31, 2026. This indicates high circular movement of cash and commodity volumes with a single group company.

p. 86, 87, 308
Audit Trail Feature Verification Failure at Database Level where: footnotes flagged

Statutory auditors reported under Rule 11(g) that they were unable to obtain sufficient and appropriate audit evidence at the database level to verify whether the accounting software managed by a third-party provider for subsidiary AGTPL had an active and tamper-proof edit log (audit trail) facility.

p. 321, 686
Severe Historical Regulatory Infractions and Penalties on Promoter Group Counterparty where: risk_section flagged

Key transacting partner and promoter group company Riddisiddhi Bullions Limited has faced major regulatory sanctions. In January 2015, RSBL was fined ₹100.00 crore by the DGFT, and in August 2015, SEBI issued an interim restraining order banning RSBL from the securities market for alleged circular stock options trading on the BSE (later settled in 2018).

p. 55, 446
Recurrent Statutory Due Payment Delays and Return Filing Defaults where: other noted

The company has recurrently delayed payments of key statutory dues across Fiscals 2026, 2025, and 2024. In Fiscal 2026, there were 12 instances of TDS delays (₹0.204 crore), 9 instances of PF delays (₹0.017 crore), and 9 instances of EPS delays (₹0.021 crore). Further, professional tax returns for the State of Maharashtra from April 2025 to March 2026 could not be filed due to technical portal issues.

p. 58, 59
Cyber Fraud and Temporary Freezing of Bank Accounts where: litigation noted

An FIR was registered at the Punjab State Cyber Crime Police Station alleging cyber fraud of ₹3.601 crore by third parties, as a result of which Augmont's bank account with SBI Bank was frozen to the extent of ₹1.390 crore. The company had to deposit ₹0.858 crore as a fixed deposit surety u/s court to secure the de-freezing of the account.

p. 423, 425
Material Litigation where: litigation flagged

Outstanding direct tax proceeding against the company u/s AY 2017-18 consists of 1 case involving ₹0.658 crore under appeal before the Income Tax Department. Outstanding customs/indirect tax proceedings against the company include 1 customs case u/s Customs Act 1962 of ₹1.383 crore, 1 customs case over gold doré purity of ₹1.476 crore, 1 GST penalty case of ₹0.116 crore, 1 bank account attachment of ₹1.525 crore, 1 GST ITC penalty case of ₹1.638 crore, 1 GST ITC denial of ₹7.322 crore, and 1 GST excess ITC claim of ₹0.918 crore (totaling ₹13.510 crore across 8 cases against taxation authorities). Active civil disputes initiated by the company include 4 material cases totaling ₹58.239 crore, including Commercial Summary Suit No. 180 of 2017. Criminal cases initiated by the company include 1 miscellaneous application against Eskaybee International Private Limited (unquantified) and 1 cyber fraud complaint involving ₹3.601 crore where the bank account was temporarily frozen. Criminal case u/s Section 138/142 of NI Act filed by subsidiary AGTPL against Mr. Senthil N V (proprietor of R S Jewel Tech) involves a cheque dishonour of ₹1.225 crore.

p. 5, 58, 111, 237 and 6 more
Auditor / RPT Notes where: rpt noted

Statutory auditors issued an unmodified opinion but included an Emphasis of Matter regarding the restatement of prior periods for the common control acquisition of AGTPL under Ind AS 103 and Ind AS 8. Additionally, under Rule 11(g), auditors noted that for subsidiary AGTPL, they were unable to comment on whether the database-level edit log (audit trail) feature of the accounting software was enabled due to a lack of database-level audit evidence.

p. 5, 58, 111, 237 and 6 more
Profit reported, cash not generated where: derived flagged

Operating cash flow was negative ₹42.16 cr in FY26 while the company reported a profit after tax of ₹348.30 cr. Profit that does not arrive as cash has to be funded from somewhere else.

rule: CFO<0 & PAT>0
Material related-party revenue where: derived flagged

27.5% of FY26 revenue (₹25,873.12 cr) came from entities connected to the promoters. Revenue sold to yourself is not revenue won in the market.

rule: RPT revenue > 15%
Growth, connected sales and falling cash together where: derived flagged

Revenue grew, the related-party share of it grew, and operating cash flow fell, all in FY26. No one of these is evidence on its own. Together they are the pattern worth understanding before the other numbers on this page.

rule: sales↑ + RPT share↑ + CFO↓
Receivables grew faster than sales where: derived noted

Trade receivables grew 372.8% against revenue growth of 42.2% in FY26. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection.

rule: receivables growth > 1.3x sales growth

Company's Claims vs Reality

We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.

We operate a full-stack integrated gold and silver platform in India, combining physical refining (Rudrapur and Mumbai refineries with 284 MTPA capacity) and secure spot delivery centers with digital B2B and B2C distribution platforms. Supported

Does the operational data confirm that the B2B spot platform and digital gold segments drive the bulk of operations, and does the company maintain significant physical refining capacity to support this full-stack model?

p. 26, 221, 234, 236, 530 (With B2B Augmont SPOT generating ₹81,750.57 crore or 86.80% of revenue in Fiscal 2026, B2C Augmont Gold For All contributing ₹6,687.24 crore or 7.10%, and a gold refining volume of 13.34 MT in Fiscal 2026 supported by two refineries of 284 MTPA capacity, the integrated model is fully supported by the operational KPIs and Segment Reporting.)

Proprietary SWOT — Company-Specific

Strengths

  • Market leadership as one of India's largest integrated precious metals platforms, with B2B registered SPOT members scaling to 5,223 and over 49.62 million digital gold customers as of FY26.
  • Unique full-stack model combining physical refining (284 MTPA collective capacity) and secure vaulting with scalable digital API B2B/B2C distribution, lowering transaction overheads.
  • Robust growth profile with consolidated revenue from operations growing at a CAGR of 64.23% to reach ₹94,186.21 crore and PAT reaching ₹348.30 crore in Fiscal 2026.

Weaknesses

  • Highly working capital-intensive business requiring substantial margin advances (100% of order value) to procure gold bullion back-to-back from banking partners.
  • Extreme reliance on B2B enterprise sales, with the Augmont SPOT platform alone contributing 86.80% (₹81,750.57 crore) of Fiscal 2026 consolidated revenue from operations.
  • High concentration of related-party transactions, with 27.42% of consolidated revenues (₹25,826.31 crore) coming from sales to group company RSBL.

Opportunities

  • Accelerating formalization and digitization of the Indian gold market, driven by mandatory BIS hallmarking and GST compliance.
  • Geographic expansion of B2B spot delivery centers and consumer Sell-Old-Gold retail branches into Tier 3 and Tier 4 cities to tap regional demand.
  • Sourcing and supply optimization through the GIFT City subsidiary, allowing direct bullion import/export on the IIBX with lower transaction costs.

Threats (material, not boilerplate)

  • Extreme volatility in global and domestic gold and silver prices, which can trigger inventory write-downs, affect consumer volumes, and inflate working capital requirements.
  • Regulatory risks surrounding digital gold, which currently lacks a specific, comprehensive regulatory framework in India and has faced past SEBI restrictions regarding broker-dealer offerings.

Live Subscription Status

122.9x

Total subscription is fed live from the exchange data feed. The category split (QIB, NII, retail) is not carried by that feed and is added by hand where it is material — so it is shown only when we have actually verified it, rather than left as blanks.

Allotment Status

25 Aug 2026
28 Aug 2026
28 Aug 2026
31 Aug 2026

Check your allotment on the registrar's portal → Registrar: MUFG Intime India

Allotment is decided by the registrar, not by us and not by the exchange. In an oversubscribed retail book, allotment is by lottery, so a large application does not improve your odds beyond one lot. If money stays blocked after the refund date, the mandate expiry (06 Oct 2026) is the date to raise with your bank.

Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions

Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.

USE OF PROCEEDS

How are the fresh issue proceeds being deployed, and does the allocation support direct business scale?

The Net Proceeds of the Fresh Issue are allocated entirely to working capital requirements (₹465.00 crore), specifically to fund gold and silver bullion procurement, maintain raw material inventory, and meet the 100% advance margin deposits required by banks and IIBX. This directly supports scaling up transactional volumes on the Augmont SPOT platform.

p. 128, 130, 236
CONCENTRATION

What is the level of customer and counterparty concentration, and does it represent a systemic vulnerability?

Customer concentration is highly material through related parties. Specifically, sales to group company Riddisiddhi Bullions Limited (RSBL) reached ₹25,826.31 crore in Fiscal 2026, representing 27.42% of consolidated revenues. On the sourcing side, the top supplier (ICBC Bank) accounted for 22.31% of total bullion procurement in FY25, indicating moderate banking partner concentration.

p. 86, 87, 237
PROFITABILITY

What drove the aggressive consolidated net profit expansion to ₹348.30 crore in Fiscal 2026?

Consolidated PAT grew from ₹75.97 crore in FY24 to ₹348.30 crore in FY26 (CAGR of 114.13%). This was driven by a massive scale-up in transaction volumes on the Augmont SPOT platform (MT of gold sold grew to 53.41 MT and silver to 1,049.05 MT in FY26) alongside a high-margin surge in digital gold offerings, where revenue rose to ₹2,159.00 crore in FY26 from ₹288.38 crore in FY24.

p. 320, 530, 548
HIDDEN RISKS

What off-balance sheet or regulatory disclosures represent the most material risk to prospective investors?

The primary hidden risks are: (i) outstanding tax and custom proceedings against the company totaling ₹13.51 crore (including a custom dispute of ₹1.48 crore over gold doré purity); (ii) unverified database-level audit trails for digital gold subsidiary AGTPL; (iii) the severe regulatory history of key group company RSBL (fined ₹100.00 crore by DGFT and banned by SEBI in the past); and (iv) the regulatory gray area of digital gold operations which lack a comprehensive sector-specific framework in India.

p. 36, 55, 321, 362, 422, 425
GMP: — — unofficial grey-market chatter, shown for information only. Never part of the FinMinutes Score.

What Earlier Investors Paid

Early capital takes real risk and is fairly rewarded for it — a large multiple built over many years is normal. What deserves a closer look is a steep step-up in a short window: a round priced cheaply only months before the offer.

ShareholderPriced atWhenvs IPO price
Riddisiddhi Bullions Limited & Prithviraj Saremal Kothari (MoA Subscribers)₹10.002012-10-3178.8x
An early round from roughly 14 years ago, at roughly 78.8x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag.
Further Allotment (Rights Issue)₹10.002019-02-1578.8x
An early round from roughly 8 years ago, at roughly 78.8x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag.
Share Sub-division (Face Value ₹10 to ₹5)—2025-02-05—
Bonus Allotment (8:1)—2025-06-24—
Optionally Convertible Preference Shares (OCPS) Conversion₹678.512025-08-181.2x
Utpal Hemendra Sheth (Private Placement)₹678.512025-08-291.2x

Prices are as stated in the filing’s allotment history and are not adjusted for later bonus issues or share splits. Where a company has issued bonus shares, the multiples above understate the true return and can even read as losses. Adjusting for that is on our list; until it is done we would rather show the raw disclosure and tell you its limits than publish a confident number that is wrong.

Lock-in Expiry Calendar

Shares held before the IPO cannot be sold immediately; they unlock in tranches. When a tranche unlocks, more shares become eligible to trade. Retail investors are frequently caught unaware by these dates. The schedule below follows from the listing date; quantities are shown only where the filing discloses them.

  • 02 Mar 2028
    Minimum Promoters' Contribution18 months
  • 03 Mar 2027
    Promoters' shareholding in excess of 20%6 months
  • 03 Mar 2027
    Entire pre-Offer Equity Share capital of our Company (other than the Minimum Promoters' Contribution)six months

An unlock means more shares may be sold — not that they will be, and not that the price will move. We state the dates; what you do with them is your call.

What Changed Between the DRHP and the RHP

Companies file a draft prospectus, then a final one. The changes in between are rarely reported, and they can be revealing.

ItemIn the DRHPIn the RHP / Addendum
Reporting Period and Restated Financial Statements
The reporting period was rolled forward by one full financial year, dropping Fiscal 2023 and adding Fiscal 2026. The restated financials now include the latest audited period ending March 31, 2026.
Restated Consolidated Financial Statements covering Fiscals 2025, 2024, and 2023Restated Consolidated Financial Statements covering Fiscals 2026, 2025, and 2024
Total Public Offer Size
The total public offer size was increased by ₹25.00 crore in the final prospectus, driven entirely by an expansion in the Offer for Sale (OFS) portion.
Up to ₹800.00 croreUp to ₹825.00 crore
Offer for Sale (OFS) Size
The Offer for Sale size was increased by ₹25.00 crore, raising total OFS proceeds for the Selling Shareholders from ₹180.00 crore to ₹205.00 crore.
Up to ₹180.00 croreUp to ₹205.00 crore
OFS Shareholder Contributions
Individual contributions to the OFS were revised upwards. Namita Ketan Kothari and Vivek Prithviraj Kothari increased their offered portion by ₹9.40 crore each, while Dimple Mukesh Kothari increased her offered portion by ₹6.20 crore.
Namita Ketan Kothari: up to ₹60.00 crore; Vivek Prithviraj Kothari: up to ₹60.00 crore; Dimple Mukesh Kothari: up to ₹60.00 croreNamita Ketan Kothari: up to ₹69.40 crore; Vivek Prithviraj Kothari: up to ₹69.40 crore; Dimple Mukesh Kothari: up to ₹66.20 crore
Book Running Lead Managers (BRLMs)
Motilal Oswal Investment Advisors Limited was newly appointed as a Book Running Lead Manager at the RHP stage.
Nuvama Wealth Management Limited, Intensive Fiscal Services Private Limited, and JM Financial LimitedNuvama Wealth Management Limited, Intensive Fiscal Services Private Limited, JM Financial Limited, and Motilal Oswal Investment Advisors Limited
Bidding Timeline / Programme
The bidding and anchor allocation dates were finalized and incorporated in the final prospectus.
Unspecified (dates left blank [●])Anchor Bidding: August 20, 2026; Bid Opens: August 21, 2026; Bid Closes: August 25, 2026
In-principle Listing Approvals
The dates for the in-principle listing approvals from the Stock Exchanges (BSE and NSE) were finalized and filled in the final prospectus.
BSE and NSE approvals pending (indicated as [●] on date of DRHP)In-principle approvals obtained from BSE and NSE on January 8, 2026
Additional Subsidiary Acquisition (AGTPL SPA 5)
Pursuant to a Share Purchase Agreement dated January 29, 2026 (AGTPL SPA 5), the Company acquired an additional 0.68% of the paid-up equity share capital of AGTPL from Sachin G. Kothari (Director), raising its total holding to 96.55%.
The Company held 95.87% of the paid-up equity share capital of Augmont Goldtech Private Limited (AGTPL)The Company holds 96.55% of the paid-up share capital of AGTPL
Contingent Liabilities (Consolidated)
On account of the roll-forward of the financial periods, the latest disclosed contingent liabilities increased by ₹2.24 crore (to ₹15.06 crore as of March 31, 2026, from ₹12.82 crore as of March 31, 2025).
₹12.82 crore as of March 31, 2025₹15.06 crore as of March 31, 2026

Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.

Gaureesh Vats Shukla
Written and verified by

Founder and Head of Research, FinMinutes

Gaureesh Vats Shukla reads Indian offer documents as an engineer. He has read several hundred of them alongside annual reports, most of them by hand before he built the structured extraction engine that now does the work at scale, and every figure on this page carries a citation back to the page of the filing it came from. To restated numbers he applies a standard forensic battery: Beneish M-score, Altman Z-double-prime, Piotroski F-score, DuPont decomposition and cash-conversion analysis. Coverage runs the full cap spectrum alongside macro, mutual funds and unlisted companies, with particular depth in the segment institutional research does not reach. The sectors closest to the work are defence and aerospace, semiconductors and electronics, technology, engineering and EPC, solar and capital goods. He holds a B.Tech in Aerospace Engineering and completed the Post Graduate Programme in Securities Markets at NISM with a research analysis specialisation.

The same research method is available as commissioned work: company diligence, industry and market-entry studies, and financial modelling. See what that covers →

Figures on this page were last recomputed from the filing on 2026-10-21.
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