Alpine Texworld
FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge
Alpine Texworld Limited manufactures grey fabric and cotton yarn, operating weaving and spinning units in Gujarat. The company earns revenue primarily through the direct sale of these manufactured textile goods, supplemented by minor trading and job-work activities.
What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾
Alpine Texworld Limited is a textile company focused on the manufacturing of grey (greige) fabric and cotton yarn. Operating heavily in Ahmedabad, Gujarat, the company derives over 97% of its operational revenue from this single state. Its physical infrastructure includes Manufacturing Unit 1 (weaving and sizing) and Manufacturing Unit 2 (spinning), with a proposed third unit to expand both capacities. The company recently undertook backward integration into spinning to reduce reliance on external yarn sourcing. Scale is bolstered by its subsidiary, Alpine Cottweave LLP, which significantly contributes to consolidated revenue and profits. The business features high concentration risks in both its supply chain and customer base; in Fiscal 2026, its top 10 suppliers accounted for 64.26% of purchases, and its top 10 customers generated 70.33% of revenue. Production leverages imported machinery, such as high-speed Picanol NV airjet looms, and operational costs are partially offset by captive solar power installations (Solar Units 2 and 3).
- Manufacturing — Sale of manufactured goods including grey fabric and cotton yarn.
- Trading — Trading of Grey Fabric and Yarn; and sale of Scrap.
- Services (Jobwork) — Rendered at point in time, specifically sizing of yarn.
- Other Operating Income — Subsidy income.
Strategic backward integration to reduce yarn sourcing and use of captive solar energy to offset power costs.
The Offer
Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds
- Proposing to finance the cost of setting up a new weaving unit at Proposed Manufacturing Unit 3 to expand its production capabilities to produce Grey Fabric at Ahmedabad, Gujarat, India — ₹30.71 cr
- Prepayment or repayment, in part or full of certain outstanding borrowings — ₹52.20 cr
- General corporate purposes
Valuation at the Offer Price
The filing does not print a single headline multiple, so this one is ours: the upper band divided by the latest restated earnings per share — the same arithmetic the “Basis for the Offer Price” section performs. It is struck on pre-issue earnings, so the post-issue figure will differ once the fresh capital is deployed. The peer group is the one the filing itself names. A premium is not the same thing as expensive and a discount is not the same thing as cheap — the peer table and the reasons sit further down this page.
FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built
Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures and what it is worth. Components with no disclosed input are dropped from the weighting entirely rather than held at an invented neutral, because a constant inside a weighted average is not neutral — it quietly drags every score toward the middle. Weighted across 5 live components.
88% of the designed weighting had real data behind it on this issue. Not yet scored here: Anchor Quality. A lower coverage figure does not mean a worse company — it means we are standing behind less of the picture, and you should read the findings below rather than the headline number.
How this is measured12%
Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.
How this is measured32%
Driven by the models battery run on the filing's own restated numbers: the Piotroski fundamental tests (scored out of those we could actually run), the Altman Z-double-prime solvency zone, and the direction of profit across the disclosed period. It is not a single yes/no on last year's profit.
How this is measured10%
The post-issue earnings multiple against the peer median disclosed in the filing. A discount to the median scores well and a premium scores badly. When the filing does not disclose comparable peer multiples, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than held at a made-up neutral.
How this is measured6%
A proxy for syndicate strength, based today only on how many lead managers are on the issue: 75 where three or more banks are involved, 60 otherwise. We have not built a bank-by-bank track record, so treat this as a rough signal. When the filing does not disclose the syndicate, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than guessed.
How this is measured28%
Starts at 100 and loses points for every material finding: 12 for a flagged finding, 4 for a noted one. Two kinds feed it. DERIVED findings are computed from the filed numbers against stated thresholds — operating cash negative while profit is positive, related-party revenue above 15% of total, revenue rising while profit falls, goodwill above 30% of net worth, receivables growing more than 1.3x faster than sales, cash below half of short-term debt. Those are reproducible: the same filing gives the same answer every time, and the rule is printed beside the finding. READ findings come from the forensic sweep of the notes. Contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications, statutory dues, promoter funding. Findings that record the ABSENCE of a problem — no litigation pending, an unmodified audit opinion — deduct nothing. This is the component our forensic read drives directly, and it moves most between companies.
3-Year Financial & Growth Trend
| Metric | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 342.713 | 237.324 | 183.603 |
| Net Profit (₹ Cr) | 21.716 | 8.626 | 4.881 |
| PAT Margin | 6.34% | 3.63% | 2.66% |
Revenue Breakdown
- Manufacturing of Grey Fabric: 96.69%
- Sizing of Yarn (Job Work): 0.13%
Market Context
NOT part of the FinMinutes ScoreThe Score above is what the filing says. Everything in this box is what the crowd says. We keep them apart on purpose — every other site blends the two and calls the result a rating. Demand is real information, but it is information about the market, not about the company, and it changes by the hour while the company does not.
Demand and our read of the filing are broadly in the same territory.
Subscription is low early in a book and high at the end, because most bids arrive in the final hours. A number read on day one says more about the clock than the company — which is precisely why it is not in the Score. GMP is unofficial, unregulated, and easily moved. Neither is a recommendation.
Deep Financials
Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.
Income StatementThe profit and loss as filed, then what we derive from it — kept apart.
Statutory order, exactly as restated in the filing. Finance cost and depreciation sit inside Total Expenses under Ind AS, which is why they are listed among the expense lines here rather than below the total. The expense rows sum to the total. Rows the filing does not disclose separately are omitted rather than left blank.
| Income Statement — as filed (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 342.71 | 237.32 | 183.60 |
| Other Income | 7.47 | 0.34 | 0.83 |
| Total Income | 350.18 | 237.66 | 184.44 |
| Cost of Materials Consumed | 254.71 | 172.02 | 140.44 |
| Employee Benefit Expense | 14.48 | 8.87 | 7.09 |
| Finance Cost | 15.33 | 9.08 | 8.51 |
| Depreciation & Amortisation | 12.69 | 6.42 | 5.56 |
| Total Expenses | 323.28 | 225.82 | 177.76 |
| Profit Before Tax | 26.90 | 11.84 | 6.67 |
| Tax Expense | 5.18 | 3.21 | 1.79 |
| Profit After Tax | 21.72 | 8.63 | 4.88 |
| EPS - Basic | 8.18 | 3.27 | 1.86 |
| EPS - Diluted | 8.18 | 3.27 | 1.86 |
Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.
| Balance Sheet (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share Capital | 26.22 | 26.22 | 26.22 |
| Reserves & Surplus | 46.66 | 24.91 | 16.33 |
| Net Worth | 72.88 | 51.13 | 42.55 |
| Long-term Borrowings | 106.47 | 99.28 | 27.39 |
| Short-term Borrowings | 71.13 | 66.81 | 49.08 |
| Total Borrowings | 177.60 | 166.09 | 76.47 |
| Trade Payables | 38.56 | 67.67 | 26.91 |
| Current Liabilities | 116.72 | 137.90 | 77.98 |
| Total Liabilities | 229.89 | 241.96 | 107.26 |
| Property, Plant & Equipment | 133.48 | 131.67 | 42.66 |
| Capital Work in Progress | 15.68 | 1.27 | — |
| Intangible Assets | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Investments | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.00 |
| Inventories | 72.09 | 47.71 | 18.47 |
| Trade Receivables | 63.24 | 96.90 | 74.12 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 0.06 | 1.53 | 0.68 |
| Current Assets | 149.11 | 157.33 | 100.08 |
| Total Assets | 305.31 | 294.86 | 149.82 |
Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.
| Cash Flow (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | 33.99 | 13.01 | 31.52 |
| Net Cash from Investing Activities | -32.37 | -94.50 | -8.06 |
| Net Cash from Financing Activities | -3.09 | 82.35 | -22.78 |
| Net Change in Cash | -1.47 | 0.85 | 0.67 |
Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.
Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.
| Ratio | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Profitability | |||
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 15.7 | 11.5 | 11.2 |
| EBIT Margin (%) | 12.1 | 8.8 | 8.2 |
| PAT Margin (%) | 6.3 | 3.6 | 2.7 |
| Return on Equity (%) | 29.8 | 16.9 | 11.5 |
| Return on Capital Employed (%) | 16.9 | 9.6 | 12.8 |
| Return on Assets (%) | 7.1 | 2.9 | 3.3 |
| Leverage | |||
| Debt / Equity (x) | 2.44 | 3.25 | 1.8 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA (x) | 3.23 | 6.02 | 3.65 |
| Interest Coverage (x) | 2.75 | 2.3 | 1.78 |
| Liquidity | |||
| Current Ratio (x) | 1.28 | 1.14 | 1.28 |
| Quick Ratio (x) | 0.66 | 0.79 | 1.05 |
| Efficiency | |||
| Asset Turnover (x) | 1.12 | 0.8 | 1.23 |
| Receivable Days | 67 | 149 | 147 |
| Inventory Days | 77 | 73 | 37 |
| Payable Days | 41 | 104 | 53 |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (days) | 103 | 118 | 131 |
| Quality of Earnings | |||
| Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x) | 1.57 | 1.51 | 6.46 |
| Accruals Ratio (%) | -4 | -1.5 | -17.8 |
DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.
A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.
| Component | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Margin (PAT / Revenue) | 6.3% | 3.6% | 2.7% |
| Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets) | 1.12x | 0.8x | 1.23x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth) | 4.19x | 5.77x | 3.52x |
| = Return on Equity | 29.8% | 16.9% | 11.5% |
| Tax Burden (PAT / PBT) | 0.81x | 0.73x | 0.73x |
| Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT) | 0.64x | 0.57x | 0.44x |
| Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue) | 12.3% | 8.8% | 8.3% |
Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.
Quality of EarningsWhat the statements say when you read them against each other.
What the statements say once you read them against each other. These are observations, not verdicts — every one is arithmetic on the numbers the company itself disclosed, and each is stated so you can go and check it in the filing.
- Operating cash flow was 1.57x reported profit in FY26. Earnings are converting into cash, which is what you want to see and frequently is not the case.
- Receivable days fell from 147 to 67. Collections improved over the disclosed period.
- Between FY24 and FY26 revenue grew 87% while profit grew 345%. Profit expanding at several times the rate of revenue is not automatically a concern — operating leverage does exactly this — but it is worth confirming from the filing whether the gap comes from genuine margin expansion or from one-off items.
- Debt to equity stood at 2.44x in FY26.
Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman and Piotroski — plus our own final-year check.
Beneish M-Score
7 of 8 inputsAn eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.
| Component | Value | What it captures |
|---|---|---|
| DSRI Days Sales in Receivables Index (Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1) | 0.452 | Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection. |
| GMI Gross Margin Index GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t | 1.072 | Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate. |
| AQI Asset Quality Index AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets | — | Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here. |
| SGI Sales Growth Index Sales_t / Sales_t-1 | 1.444 | Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going. |
| DEPI Depreciation Index DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE) | 0.536 | Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit. |
| SGAI SG&A Index (SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses | 1.13 | A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure. |
| LVGI Leverage Index Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets | 0.909 | Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers. |
| TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets (PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets | -0.0402 | The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash. |
The filing does not disclose every input the model needs, so we withhold the composite score rather than substitute a guess. The components we could compute are above.
Altman Z″-Score (emerging markets)
Z″ = 5.71 · SafeA distress-prediction model. We use the Z″ variant deliberately: the original Z was calibrated on American manufacturers and misleads badly on Indian services companies. Above 2.6 is the safe zone, 1.1 to 2.6 is grey, below 1.1 is the distress zone. Like every model of its kind it is a screen, not a prophecy.
| X1 — Working Capital / Total Assets | 0.106 |
| X2 — Retained Earnings / Total Assets | 0.153 |
| X3 — EBIT / Total Assets | 0.138 |
| X4 — Net Worth / Total Liabilities | 0.317 |
| Z″ = 3.25 + 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X4 | 5.71 |
Piotroski F-Score (adapted)
6 / 8Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test and score out of eight, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it.
- ✓Positive return on assets
- ✓Positive operating cash flow
- ✓Return on assets improving
- ✓Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
- ✗Long-term leverage decreasing
- ✓Current ratio improving
- ✗Gross margin improving
- ✓Asset turnover improving
The Final-Year Check
oursNot from any textbook. The hockey stick in the last year before a filing is the oldest pattern in this business, and nobody publishes it. So we measure it: how the final disclosed year compares with the years behind it. Real acceleration looks exactly the same on the page as a flattering one — which is precisely why it is worth naming rather than assuming either way.
- The EBITDA margin expanded by 4.5 percentage points in FY26, having moved 0.2 points the year before. Margin expansion concentrated into the final disclosed year is worth understanding: operating leverage produces it honestly, and so does a change in what gets capitalised.
Ratios Nobody Prints
- Contingent liabilities / Net worth: 93.9%
Contingent liabilities of 68.46 cr against a net worth of 72.88 cr — 93.9% of what the company is worth on paper. These are obligations that sit off the balance sheet but could land on it. What they consist of matters as much as the size: a corporate guarantee to a subsidiary is a different animal from a disputed tax demand, and the filing says which. - Related-party revenue / Total revenue: 6.5%
6.5% of revenue in FY26 came from entities connected to the promoters. Revenue you sell to yourself is not the same as revenue you won in the market. - Cash / Short-term borrowings: 0x
Short-term borrowings of 71.13 cr against cash of 0.06 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is only comfortable while lenders stay comfortable. - Promoter remuneration / PAT: 3.7%
Managerial remuneration to the promoter group was 0.80 cr against a profit of 21.72 cr. This is a legitimate cost — but it is also a route by which value leaves a company before it ever reaches a minority shareholder.
The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.
Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.
PAT ÷ Net Worth21.72 ÷ 72.88What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.
EBIT ÷ (Net Worth + Total Borrowings)42.22 ÷ (72.88 + 177.60) = 42.22 ÷ 250.48Return on ALL the capital in the business, borrowed as well as owned. Unlike ROE, it cannot be flattered by taking on debt.
EBITDA ÷ Revenue54.91 ÷ 342.71Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.
Total Borrowings ÷ Net Worth177.60 ÷ 72.88How much the company has borrowed against what it owns. High is not automatically bad — ask whether the borrowing is being serviced comfortably.
EBIT ÷ Finance Cost42.22 ÷ 15.33How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.
(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365(63.24 ÷ 342.71) × 365How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.
Inventory Days + Receivable Days − Payable Days77 + 67 − 41How long cash is tied up in the operating cycle before it comes back. The longer it is, the more working capital the business must fund.
Cash from Operations ÷ PAT33.99 ÷ 21.72Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.
(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets(21.72 − 33.99) ÷ 305.31 = -12.27 ÷ 305.31The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.
Price × Post-issue Shares₹105.00 × 26,547,677 sharesWhat the whole company is being valued at, if the issue prices at the top of the band.
Market Cap + Total Borrowings − Cash278.75 + 177.60 − 0.06What it would actually cost to buy the whole business: you take on its debt and you get its cash. This is the number a buyer cares about, and it is the reason a P/E on its own can mislead.
Enterprise Value ÷ EBITDA456.29 ÷ 54.91The multiple that includes debt. Two companies on the same P/E — one debt-free, one heavily borrowed — are not the same investment, and only this number tells you so.
Market Cap ÷ PAT278.75 ÷ 21.72The familiar multiple. Useful, but blind to debt — read it alongside EV/EBITDA, never instead of it.
EBIT × (1 − tax rate) ÷ (Net Worth + Debt − Cash)NOPAT ÷ Invested CapitalWhat the business earns on the capital actually at work in it. We do not compare this to a cost of capital: that would need a beta, an unlisted company has none, and inventing one would be theatre.
P/E ÷ trailing PAT growth (%)12.84 ÷ 151.8%PEG was designed for FORWARD growth. This one uses TRAILING growth, because that is all a prospectus gives us — and the final year before an IPO is very often the best year the company will have for a while. A low PEG here may say more about the timing of the filing than about the price. We show it because it was asked for; we show the growth denominator beside it so it cannot mislead you quietly.
Workspace
The post-issue share count is stated as “[•]” in this filing until final pricing, so we derive it: profit after tax divided by earnings per share gives the pre-issue count, and the fresh issue divided by the offer price gives the new shares. Everything below rests on that derivation. It is close, not exact.
The numbers are already loaded. Move the offer price and watch every multiple move with it. Set your own growth and margin and see what they imply two years out. These are your assumptions, not our forecast — we have no view on what this company will earn, and the moment we published one we would be doing something we are not registered to do. What we can do is put the arithmetic in front of you and get out of the way.
Price defaults to the top of the band. Margin defaults to what the company actually reported in FY26.
Projections are arithmetic on the inputs you typed. They are not a forecast, not a recommendation, and not a view on whether this offer is worth taking. Educational only.
Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive
The Indian textile processing industry is highly fragmented, featuring numerous small and unorganized players, which poses challenges for maintaining quality standards and meeting global compliance norms. Natural textiles form the leading segment of this market, supported by an abundant domestic supply of natural fibers like cotton, jute, and silk. This ensures a stable raw material base for domestic manufacturers of yarn and fabric. The sector is further supported by government policies, including the Production Linked Incentive (PLI) scheme and the PM MITRA parks, which aim to foster integrated textile clusters and modernize manufacturing infrastructure.
Future Planning & Capital Allocation
The company is directing its IPO proceeds toward expanding its weaving capabilities by setting up a third manufacturing unit in Ahmedabad (₹30.71 crore) and aggressively deleveraging its balance sheet by prepaying/repaying outstanding debt (₹52.20 crore).
Source: RHP p. 124, Objects of the IssueCompetitive Position
Operating in a highly fragmented and unorganized textile market, Alpine Texworld aims to build a moat through vertical integration. By integrating backwards into spinning and utilizing captive solar power, it is attempting to protect its margins against volatile cotton prices and high energy costs, giving it a structural advantage over smaller, non-integrated peers.
Source: RHP p. 226, 258Execution / Track Record
The company has a mixed execution track record. While it successfully scaled revenues to ₹342.71 crore in FY26, it has demonstrated past compliance lapses. These include starting its Manufacturing Unit 2 without the requisite environmental consents and failing to maintain complete ROC filings (such as Form DPT-3), pointing to a lax internal governance culture.
Source: RHP p. 29, 35-37, 230Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership
Leadership & Skin in the Game
Leadership: Sandeep Santkumar Agrawal (Managing Director)
Litigation: Against Company: ₹18.70 million (direct/indirect tax). Against Promoters: ₹0.15 million (tax) and ₹0.15 million (civil). By Promoters: ₹8.98 million (civil).
Peers & Valuation
| Company | P/E | P/B | RoE | Margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| United Polyfab Gujarat Limited | 31.6 | — | 18.48 | — |
| Ken Enterprises Limited | 5.27 | — | 12.14 | — |
| Pashupati Cotspin Limited | 145.21 | — | 6.33 | — |
At the ₹105 upper band, the issue is priced at 12.8x earnings — a 79% discount to the peer median of 60.7x. This is the arithmetic of the price band against the peers the filing itself lists; it is not a view on whether the offer is worth taking.
🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say
Findings from across the filing — the notes, MD&A, related-party disclosures, contingent liabilities, CARO and litigation, alongside the risk section itself. Each carries where it was found, so you can see which were buried and which were disclosed. Findings marked derived are computed from the filed numbers against a stated rule, shown beside them.
CRISIL downgraded the company's long-term rating to 'CRISIL BB/Stable' and short-term rating to 'CRISIL A4+' with an 'Issuer Not Cooperating' remark on June 15, 2026, due to non-submission of surveillance information and a fee dispute.
RHP p. 31, Risk FactorsSeveral historical statutory filings with the RoC (such as Form DPT-3 for the period 2014-2019) are untraceable despite searches. The company also delayed the mandatory appointment of a Whole-Time Company Secretary from December 2020 to November 2021.
RHP p. 35-37, Risk FactorsIn FY26, the top 10 customers accounted for 70.33% of revenue from operations, and the top 10 suppliers accounted for 64.26% of total purchases. The company does not have long-term firm commitments with these parties.
RHP p. 29, 39, 425-427The company commenced operations at Manufacturing Unit 2 (Spinning Unit) without obtaining the mandatory Consolidated Consent and Authorization (CCA) from the Gujarat Pollution Control Board. They subsequently paid ₹1.98 million to regularize the non-compliance.
RHP p. 29, Risk FactorsAgainst Company: ₹18.70 million (direct/indirect tax). Against Promoters: ₹0.15 million (tax) and ₹0.15 million (civil). By Promoters: ₹8.98 million (civil).
RHP p. 45-46, 116, 261, 4546.5% of FY26 revenue came from connected entities.
rule: RPT revenue 5-15%Short-term borrowings of ₹71.13 cr against cash of ₹0.06 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is comfortable only while lenders stay comfortable.
rule: cash < 0.5x short-term debtCompany's Claims vs Reality
We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.
Do the financials reflect this integration? Yes, the company shows improved Gross Profit margins (24.61%) and expanding EBITDA margins, partly driven by captive consumption.
RHP p. 222, 226, Basis for Issue PriceAre there solar assets on the books? Yes, the debt schedule shows a Rupee Term Loan for a 'Ground Mounted Solar' plant hypothecated over 32,375 sq. mtrs of land.
RHP p. 222, 344Proprietary SWOT — Company-Specific
Strengths
- Strategic backward integration into spinning (Manufacturing Unit 2) to reduce reliance on external yarn sourcing and improve margins.
- Use of captive solar power plants to offset inherently high energy and operational costs in textile manufacturing.
Weaknesses
- Severe concentration risks with the top 10 customers generating 70.33% of revenue and top 10 suppliers accounting for 64.26% of purchases in FY26.
- Sub-par credit profile, recently downgraded to CRISIL BB/Stable with an 'Issuer Not Cooperating' tag due to disputes over surveillance fees and non-submission of information.
Opportunities
- Expansion of weaving capacity through the Proposed Manufacturing Unit 3 (funded via IPO proceeds) will increase production scale to meet growing textile demand.
- Government initiatives like the PLI scheme and PM MITRA parks support the broader textile sector's integrated growth.
Threats (material, not boilerplate)
- Extreme geographic concentration risk, as production facilities and over 97% of operations are localized in the state of Gujarat. risk_section
Why it matters: Any regional disruption, adverse state policy change, or localized economic slowdown in Gujarat's textile clusters could severely impact the entire business operation. - Volatility in the prices of raw cotton and cotton yarn. risk_section
Why it matters: Cotton is an agricultural commodity subject to severe price swings based on weather, crop yields, and minimum support prices, directly threatening gross margins if the company cannot pass on costs to customers.
Live Subscription Status
Total subscription is fed live from the exchange data feed. The category split (QIB, NII, retail) is not carried by that feed and is added by hand where it is material — so it is shown only when we have actually verified it, rather than left as blanks.
Allotment Status
Check your allotment on the registrar's portal → Registrar: KFin Technologies
Allotment is decided by the registrar, not by us and not by the exchange. In an oversubscribed retail book, allotment is by lottery, so a large application does not improve your odds beyond one lot. If money stays blocked after the refund date, the mandate expiry (27 Aug 2026) is the date to raise with your bank.
Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions
Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.
Where is the money going?
The IPO is a fresh issue. The company plans to use ₹30.71 crore to set up a new weaving unit (Proposed Manufacturing Unit 3) in Ahmedabad, and ₹52.20 crore will be utilized for the prepayment or repayment of certain outstanding borrowings. The balance will go towards general corporate purposes.
RHP p. 124How concentrated is the customer and supplier base?
Highly concentrated. In FY26, the top 10 customers accounted for 70.33% of operational revenue, and the top 10 suppliers accounted for 64.26% of purchases. Additionally, over 97% of operations are geographically concentrated in Gujarat.
RHP p. 39, 47, 425-427Is it profitable and growing?
Yes. Consolidated revenue from operations grew from ₹183.60 crore in FY24 to ₹342.71 crore in FY26. Consolidated PAT grew significantly from ₹4.88 crore in FY24 to ₹21.71 crore in FY26, yielding a Return on Net Worth (RoNW) of 29.44% in FY26.
RHP p. 230-231, 260What sits in the footnotes / contingent liabilities?
The company has total contingent liabilities of ₹68.46 crore as of FY26. This predominantly comprises corporate guarantees of ₹55.75 crore issued in favor of its subsidiary, Alpine Cottweave LLP, alongside disputed tax demands (GST/Income Tax) of approximately ₹1.88 crore.
RHP p. 418What Earlier Investors Paid
Early capital takes real risk and is fairly rewarded for it — a large multiple built over many years is normal. What deserves a closer look is a steep step-up in a short window: a round priced cheaply only months before the offer.
| Shareholder | Priced at | When | vs IPO price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sandeep Santkumar Agrawal | ₹10.00 | 2016-02-26 | 10.5x |
| An early round from roughly 11 years ago, at roughly 10.5x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Sumit Champalal Agarwal | ₹10.00 | 2016-02-26 | 10.5x |
| An early round from roughly 11 years ago, at roughly 10.5x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Sumit Champalal Agarwal | ₹82.00 | 2017-03-31 | 1.3x |
| Champalal Gopiram Agarwal | ₹82.00 | 2017-03-31 | 1.3x |
| Aarnav Industries Private Limited | ₹82.00 | 2017-03-31 | 1.3x |
| Sandeep S. Agrawal | ₹82.00 | 2017-03-31 | 1.3x |
| Sumit Champalal Agarwal | — | 2020-12-21 | — |
| Sachinkumar Santkumar Agrawal | — | 2020-12-21 | — |
Prices are as stated in the filing’s allotment history and are not adjusted for later bonus issues or share splits. Where a company has issued bonus shares, the multiples above understate the true return and can even read as losses. Adjusting for that is on our list; until it is done we would rather show the raw disclosure and tell you its limits than publish a confident number that is wrong.
Lock-in Expiry Calendar
Shares held before the IPO cannot be sold immediately; they unlock in tranches. When a tranche unlocks, more shares become eligible to trade. Retail investors are frequently caught unaware by these dates. The schedule below follows from the listing date; quantities are shown only where the filing discloses them.
- 21 Jul 2029Minimum Promoters' Contribution3 years
- 21 Jul 2027Promoters' shareholding in excess of 20%1 year
- 21 Jan 2027Entire pre-Issue Equity Share capitalsix months
An unlock means more shares may be sold — not that they will be, and not that the price will move. We state the dates; what you do with them is your call.
What Changed Between the DRHP and the RHP
Companies file a draft prospectus, then a final one. The changes in between are rarely reported, and they can be revealing.
| Item | In the DRHP | In the RHP / Addendum |
|---|---|---|
| Fresh issue size The fresh issue size was reduced by approximately 20% (from 1.50 crore shares to 1.20 crore shares) between the draft and the final filing. | Up to 1,50,00,000 Equity Shares | Up to 1,20,24,000 Equity Shares |
| Financial Information Period The restated financial statements were rolled forward by one full fiscal year, incorporating the newly completed FY26 and dropping FY23. | Restated financial statements for the years ended March 31, 2025, March 31, 2024, and March 31, 2023 | Restated financial statements for the years ended March 31, 2026, March 31, 2025, and March 31, 2024 |
| Contingent Liabilities Contingent liabilities increased by roughly ₹108.5 million between the filings, primarily due to a newly reported Outstanding Export Obligation under the EPCG Scheme amounting to ₹108.29 million. | ₹576.02 million | ₹684.59 million |
Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.